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Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real-Offense
Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines
David Yellen*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most remarkable and controversial aspects of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") is that the length
of a defendant's sentence may be based, not only upon the
crimes for which the defendant has been convicted, but also
upon alleged crimes related to the offense of conviction, for
which the defendant was not convicted. For example, a defend-
ant convicted of embezzling money may be sentenced as if he
had been convicted of several additional alleged embezzlements,
notwithstanding the government's failure to bring such addi-
tional charges, the dismissal of the charges as part of a plea
agreement, or even the defendant's acquittal of the additional
charges.
The United States Sentencing Commission ("Sentencing
Commission") adopted this "alleged related-offense" sentencing
as part of its attempt to resolve a central question posed in form-
ing any comprehensive sentencing system: what range of infor-
mation should be considered in fashioning an appropriate
sentence? At one extreme, a sentencing regime might impose
identical sentences on all offenders convicted of violating the
same statute. At the other extreme, judges might be authorized
or required to consider all of the available information about an
offender's life, as well as evidence concerning the offense of con-
viction. This dichotomy is commonly referred to, in terms that
conceal as much as they reveal, as the choice between charge-
offense and real-offense sentencing.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, Hofstra University. B.A. 1979, Princeton
University; J.D. 1984, Cornell University. I am grateful to Robin Charlow,
Larry Kessler, Carl Mayer, Marc Miller and Michael Tonry for their comments.
1. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUiELNEs
MNuAL ch. 1, pt. A(4)(a) (1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G..
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Rather than binary alternatives, charge- and real-offense
sentencing represent the end points of a continuum of possible
sentencing information. Real-offense and charge-offense sen-
tencing are like a Scylla and Charybdis through which drafters
of sentencing guidelines must attempt to navigate. Real-offense
sentencing may be overly complex, administratively burden-
some, and manifestly unfair in at least some of its applications.
Charge-offense sentencing may fail to adequately distinguish of-
fenders based on their culpability and may shift sentencing dis-
cretion to the prosecutor. Sentencing policy makers, in selecting
a point along this continuum, must weigh the relevance to the
sentencing decision of various categories of information about
the offense and the offender, and consider the fairness of basing
punishment on facts beyond those established by a conviction.
In so doing, policy makers must bear in mind the potential con-
flict between their goals and the realities of the criminal justice
system, particularly plea bargaining practices. The choice be-
tween charge- and real-offense sentencing thus has both practi-
cal and philosophical implications for any attempt to create a
more just and effective sentencing system.
The members of the Sentencing Commission2 regarded the
election between charge-offense and real-offense oriented ap-
proaches as a cardinal assignment when they set out to draft the
Guidelines in the mid-1980s.3 In what members of the Sentenc-
ing Commission have called a "key compromise"4 that formed
the "cornerstone"5 of the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commis-
sion ultimately settled on an ambitious and innovative ap-
proach, combining elements of both charge- and real-offense
sentencing.
This Article examines the Guidelines' approach to real-of-
fense sentencing, particularly its employment of alleged related-
offense sentencing. There has never before been an opportunity
to investigate a functioning real-offense sentencing system. The
Sentencing Commission's decision to employ a strong version of
mandatory real-offense sentencing, particularly its inclusion of
alleged related-offense sentencing, is unprecedented in the his-
2. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988).
3. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch.1, pt. A(4)(a).
4. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Corn-
promises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1988).
5. William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cor-
nerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rav. 495 (1990).
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tory of American sentencing systems.6 Although at least some
real-offense sentencing practices have a long history of judicial
acceptance, prior to the Guidelines they were generally hidden,
because a judge's decision as to the scope of information to be
included in the sentencing process was discretionary and often
unexplained. 7 For the first time, six years after the introduction
of the Guidelines, an assessment of real-offense sentencing can
draw upon the actual experience of creating and implementing
such a system.
The conclusions of this Article can be summarized briefly.
The Sentencing Commission's decision to require alleged re-
lated-offense sentencing was ill-conceived and poorly executed,
and has contributed to a system plagued by illogic and injustice.
The Guidelines fail to reflect a sound rationale for any use of
alleged related-offense sentencing, much less for the particular
manner in which it is used. The Sentencing Commission also
failed to foresee that plea bargaining practices would largely un-
dermine the imagined benefits of this far-reaching form of real-
offense sentencing. Although the tension between charge- and
real-offense sentencing is real, alleged related-offense sentenc-
ing has been revealed as an illusory remedy.
Part II of this Article defines and contrasts charge- and
real-offense sentencing and discusses the significance of each
approach. After developing a working definition of charge- and
real-offense sentencing, this framework is then applied to the
pre-Guidelines federal sentencing system, in order to describe
the extent to which it was charge- or real-offense based. Finally
6. Traditional sentencing systems based on judicial discretion have real-
offense aspects, but they are not mandatory. See infra part II.C. None of the
state sentencing guidelines systems adopted prior to the federal guidelines in-
corporated mandatory real-offense sentencing. See Michael Tonry, Salvaging
the Sentencing Guidelines in Seven Easy Steps, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 355,
356-57 (1992) [hereinafter Tonry, Seven Easy Steps]; see also infra notes 129,
203, 217 & 229 (discussing state guidelines' approach to real-offense
sentencing).
In 1978 the Uniform Law Commissioners adopted a Model Sentencing and
Corrections Act calling for comprehensive real-offense sentencing, but no state
adopted that proposal. See MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS AcT, 10
U.L.A. Sentencing Act Special Pamphlet (1985) [hereinafter MODEL AcT]. For
a critique of this proposal, see Michael H. Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The
Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, 72 J. CRim. L. & CRIINOLOGY 1550
(1981) [hereinafter Tonry, Real Offense]. A real-offense model has been applied
to parole decisions. In the 1970's, the United States Parole Commission devel-
oped its own guidelines to govern release decisions, and those guidelines were
in large part real-offense oriented. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.19 (1980).
7. See infra part II.C.
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this section considers the important implications plea bargain-
ing has on the choice between charge- and real-offense guide-
lines regimes.
Part III describes the Sentencing Commission's compromise
between charge- and real-offense sentencing. This section goes
on to identify those aspects of the Guidelines that are charge-
offense oriented and those that are more real-offense in nature.
Part IV considers in more detail the Guidelines' version of
alleged related-offense sentencing. Initially, this section illus-
trates the dramatic impact this approach has on many
sentences. This impact varies greatly among categories of of-
fenses and is marked by inconsistency and apparent anomalies.
Next, this section scrutinizes the Sentencing Commission's ra-
tionale for alleged related-offense sentencing. The Sentencing
Commission's explanation for incorporating alleged related-of-
fense sentencing at all, and for then treating different categories
of offenses dramatically differently, is surprisingly superficial
and opaque. This section considers alternative rationales and
finds them similarly unconvincing, leading to the conclusion
that there is no sound rationale for alleged related-offense sen-
tencing. Finally, this section discusses how, even when taken on
its own terms, the Guidelines' version of alleged related-offense
sentencing does not achieve the Sentencing Commission's goals.
Part V considers possible reforms of the Guidelines' current
approach. This section concludes by suggesting a framework for
future sentencing commissions and legislatures to apply in ad-
dressing real-offense sentencing.
H. WHAT ARE CHARGE- AND REAL-OFFENSE
SENTENCING AND WHY DOES THE CHOICE
BETWEEN THEM MATTER?
A. DEFINING CHARGE- AND REAL-OFFENSE SENTENCING
Charge-offense sentencing is the simpler of the two con-
cepts. It refers to a court grounding its sentencing decisions on
the offense of conviction.8 In an important sense, all sentencing
is charge-based because the statutory maximum applicable to
the defendant's offense of conviction establishes the outer limits
8. As this definition illustrates, charge-offense is something of a misno-
mer: conviction-offense sentencing is a more accurate description. Nonethe-
less, charge-offense sentencing will be used throughout this Article, because the
Sentencing Commission uses that terminology. See supra note 1 and accompa-
nying text.
406 [Vol. 78:403
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of an allowable sentence. 9 Under a pure charge-offense system,
two defendants convicted of violating the same statute would re-
ceive the same sentence, without regard to any aggravating or
mitigating factors.
Charge-offense sentencing need not appear in such a pure
form. A modified charge-offense system might take into account
some factors other than the offense of conviction, such as the
defendant's criminal record. 10 Similarly, a sentencing decision
might be constrained, but not completely determined, by the of-
fense of conviction. For example, mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing provisions, such as those now common in federal narcotics
law, are charge-oriented because they mandate a minimum sen-
tence for defendants convicted of violating certain statutes."
These provisions do not represent pure charge-offense sentenc-
ing because the judge can impose a sentence above the
mandatory minimum term up to the statutory maximum.' 2 Any
sentencing rule requiring a particular decision or limiting the
9. See, e.g., United States v. Valente, 961 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that "when a statute requires a different sentence than that set by the
Sentencing Guidelines, the statute controls"); United States v. Rodriguez, 938
F.2d 319, 320 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Larotonda, 927 F.2d 697, 698
(2d Cir. 1991); see also U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5G1.1 (providing that notwith-
standing the applicable guideline range, the sentence imposed may be no
greater than that authorized by statute of conviction).
10. Minnesota's sentencing guidelines, which are essentially charge ori-
ented, take into account the defendants criminal history, which, as in the Fed-
eral Guidelines, makes up the horizontal axis of the sentencing grid. See MINN.
SENTENCING COMM'N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § IV (1992) (Sentencing
Guidelines Grid). For a discussion of sentencing guidelines grids, see Marc
Miller, True Grid: Revealing Sentencing Policy, 25 U.C. DAviS L. REV. 587
(1992).
11. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENAL-
TIES IN THE FEDERAL CRMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991) (criticizing the prolifera-
tion of mandatory minimum penalties and noting the tension between such
penalties and sentencing guidelines); Michael Tonry, Mandatory Minimum
Penalties and the U.S. Sentencing Commission's "Mandatory Guidelines", 4
FED. SENTENCING REP. 129 (1991) (noting the similarities between the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes).
12. In addition, the judge can impose a sentence below the mandatory min-
imum only if the government files a motion indicating that the defendant has
provided "substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988). The Guidelines contain a similar provi-
sion, authorizing a departure from the applicable guideline range based on the
government's substantial assistance motion. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K1.1.
This guideline has been controversial. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Lupkin, Note,
5K1.1 and Substantial Assistance Departure: The Illusory Carrot of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1519 (1991) (noting that the "[u]pon
motion of the government" clause has been interpreted as both a mechanical
provision and an advisory clause).
1993]
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sentencer's options based on the offense of conviction is a
"charge-offense element." "Charge-offense sentencing" refers to
any sentencing system that principally relies on charge-offense
elements.
Real-offense sentencing is a more elusive concept, without
widespread agreement on its meaning.' 3 The phrase itself is
something of a misnomer, suggesting simply an attempt to dis-
cover the true nature of the offense committed by the defend-
ant.14 A broader definition is appropriate, however, because the
concerns raised by real-offense sentencing relate to a judge's re-
liance on any fact not necessary for conviction. Therefore, for
purposes of this Article, real-offense sentencing is the antithesis
of charge-offense sentencing. A "pure" real-offense system
would be one that considered the entirety of the defendant's life,
an almost limitless undertaking.15 While the statute of convic-
tion determines or constrains a charge-offense element, a "real-
offense element" is any sentencing factor not included in the def-
inition of the offense of conviction and either established at trial
or admitted by the defendant as part of a guilty plea. This Arti-
cle uses the phrase "real-offense sentencing" to refer to any sys-
tem incorporating real-offense elements to a significant extent.
With this general definition in place, one can identify the
wide variety of real-offense elements and group them into mean-
Mandatory minimum statutes may deviate from charge-offense sentencing
in other ways as well, such as by having facts necessary to their applicability
determined at sentencing, rather than as elements of the offense. See infra
note 17.
13. The Guidelines refer to a real-offense system as one in which the sen-
tence is based "upon the actual conduct in which the defendant engaged regard-
less of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted." U.S.S.G., supra note
1, § 1A4.a; see also Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense
Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REv. 523, 526 n.15 (1992) (noting different definitions of
real-offense).
14. Few would advocate sentencing the defendant for something other than
his or her "real" offense. The phrase "real offense sentencing" suggests an aura
of inevitability and unquestionable propriety, thereby masking the debatable
assumptions underlying the practice of looking beyond the offense of conviction
in determining the sentence. For a discussion of the way in which the use of
language can affect and limit critical analysis of phenomena, see HERBERT M.AR-
CUSE, ONE-DnmNSIONAL MAN 84 -120 (1964).
15. See L. WINs ET AL., SENTENCING GuInEUNES: STRUCTURING JUDI-
cIAL DismCRION 15 (1978) ("Since human beings are capable of a virtually infi-
nite variety of behaviors, the amount of information available about such
behavior is also nearly infinite."); cf 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988) ("No limitation
shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and
conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence.").
408 [Vol. 78:403
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ingful categories. A helpful starting point is to recognize that
virtually all relevant sentencing information either pertains to
the offense or to the offender. Although this is by no means the
only possible analytical framework,16 and does not account for
all possible sentencing information, 17 it will facilitate under-
standing the Sentencing Commission's approach and assessing
the merits of taking into consideration any particular real-of-
fense element at sentencing.
Offense information enables the sentencing judge to make a
more complete assessment of the case by looking beyond the
mere elements of the offense for which the defendant was con-
victed. The general type of such information, offense character-
istics, are aggravating or mitigating factors concerning the
offense of conviction. Offense characteristics can be either crim-
inal or noncriminal in nature, depending upon whether they
constitute separate criminal offenses.
Noncriminal offense characteristics do not constitute sepa-
rate offenses. For example, in a fraud case the sentence might
be affected by the amount of the fraud. A typical fraud statute
does not make the amount of gain or loss an element of the of-
fense, nor does a large fraud expose the offender to more charges
or a harsher statutory maximum penalty than does a small
fraud.' 8 Another example of a noncriminal offense characteris-
tic a court might consider is the role the defendant played in the
offense.
Criminal offense characteristics, in contrast, are facts con-
cerning the offense of conviction that could result in a prosecu-
tion for a separate criminal offense. 19 If a bank robber uses a
gun and injures a teller, these facts can be seen as aggravating
factors to the offense of conviction (robbery), but they may also
expose the defendant to prosecution for additional offenses (as-
sault, weapons possession).20
16. For a somewhat different analytical structure, see Reitz, supra note 13,
at 527, 535.
17. A sentencer interested in maximizing general deterrence might, for ex-
ample, take into account an increasing occurrence rate for the type of crime
committed by the defendant. This information concerns neither the offender,
nor the manner in which the offense was committed.
18. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1344 (1988).
19. Michael Tonry and John Coffee have referred to these as "legally recog-
nized" facts. Michael Tonry & John C. Coffee, Jr., Enforcing Sentencing Guide-
lines: Plea Bargaining and Review Mechanisms, in THE SENTNCING
COMMSSION AND rrs GUIDELINES 142, 155 (1987).
20. The principal federal drug mandatory minimum statute, § 841(b) of Ti-
te 21, incorporates offense characteristic sentencing by basing the applicable
1993] 409
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One could also extend the concept of offense characteristics
to include the defendant's acts in preparation for the offense of
conviction, or in its immediate aftermath, that manifest the seri-
ousness of the offense. For example, a judge or sentencing com-
mission might view as aggravating factors the defendant's
extensive planning activity prior to the offense, the defendant's
theft of a car to aid in a robbery, or the defendant's taking of a
hostage or driving recklessly while escaping from the offense.
These factors, like all offense characteristics, can be either crim-
inal or noncriminal in nature.
Another type of offense information, which this Article re-
fers to as "alleged more-serious-offense" information, might be
used by a court to sentence defendants based upon a more seri-
ous offense that the court believes the defendant actually com-
mitted.2 1 For example, a judge might believe that a defendant
who pleaded guilty to, or was convicted of, simple possession of
narcotics actually was guilty of possession with the intent to dis-
tribute, and sentence the defendant on that basis. The defend-
ant may have been acquitted of that more serious offense, 22 it
mandatory term on the drug quantity involved in the offense, an amount that
courts have held is not an element of the offense, but a fact to be determined at
sentencing. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1988); see, e.g., United States v. Hodges,
935 F.2d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 251 (1991) and 112
S.Ct. 317 (1991); United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Wood, 834 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. Ruv. 199,
205 (1993) ("To date, the courts have uniformly held that the drug quantities
specified in section 841(b) are not elements of the offense but solely sentencing
factors to be considered by the judge.").
21. The meaning of a "more-serious" offense is not self-evident. It might
mean an offense with a higher statutory maximum, an offense for which the
applicable guideline range is more serious, or simply an offense which the judge
believes calls for a harsher sentence than the offense of conviction.
22. Despite the overtones of double jeopardy, most courts have sanctioned
the consideration at sentencing of alleged conduct for which the defendant has
been acquitted. This is because an "[a]cquittal does not have the effect of con-
clusively establishing the untruth of all the evidence introduced against [a] de-
fendant." United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1972). In addition,
the government may still prove the alleged crime by the lower preponderance of
the evidence standard generally applicable at sentencing. United States v. Lee,
818 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987); see also Reitz,
supra note 13, at 531 n.49 (citing and discussing such cases). But see, United
States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1991) (arguing that "we would per-
vert our system ofjustice if we allowed a defendant to suffer punishment for a
criminal charge for which he or she was acquitted"); Reitz, supra note 13, at
533 n.63 (noting that several state courts refuse to allow acquitted conduct to be
considered).
[Vol. 78:403410
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may never have been charged, or the more serious charge may
have been dropped as part of a plea bargain.
There is a wide spectrum of offender information that might
be relevant to sentencing. Sentencing courts have traditionally
considered a variety of offender characteristics concerning the
defendant's background, such as the defendant's age, employ-
ment history, drug or alcohol use, and family or community
ties.23 A court could also consider the defendant's prior record of
criminal convictions 24 and alleged prior criminal conduct not
leading to convictions.
In addition, a court might be interested in the defendant's
conduct subsequent to the offense of conviction. The defendant
may have attempted to avoid detection or responsibility for the
offense by, for example, obstructing the investigation or commit-
ting peijury at trial. The defendant's contrition or willingness to
plead guilty also traditionally have had a significant impact on
the sentence. 25 This type of behavior is best labelled offender,
rather than offense, information. This is because if such infor-
mation is relevant to sentencing,26 it is not because it reveals
anything about the offense of conviction, but rather because it
sheds light on the defendant's character or culpability.
Finally we come to that category of information referred to
herein as alleged related-offense sentencing. In addition to the
offense of conviction, a judge might consider offenses that the
defendant allegedly committed which are related in some way to
the offense of conviction, but for which the defendant was not
convicted. A defendant convicted of one robbery or drug sale
might be sentenced based on several other contemporaneous
robberies or drug sales which the court believes the defendant to
have committed. Similar to alleged more-serious-offenses, the
defendant may not have been charged with the additional of-
fenses, charges may have been dropped as part of a plea bargain,
or the defendant may have been acquitted27 of such charges.
Some might argue that alleged related-offenses should be
regarded as a species of offense, not offender, information. It is
more useful and accurate, however, to classify an alleged re-
23. See, e.g., WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF
WHITE-COLLAR CmIuALs 102-08 (1988).
24. This is the one real-offense category that is based on facts that have
been proved in a criminal trial or that the defendant has admitted as part of a
guilty plea.
25. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 23, at 115-18.
26. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 22.
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lated-offense as offender information. An alleged related-offense
is really part of the defendant's alleged criminal history. The
fact that an alleged offense bears a relationship to the offense of
conviction does not convert it into information about the offense
of which the defendant was convicted. In this sense an alleged
related-offense differs from an alleged more-serious-offense or a
criminal offense characteristic, both of which are offense facts
because they do not require an examination of facts beyond the
incident leading to the defendant's conviction. Ultimately, label-
ling alleged related-offenses as either offense or offender infor-
mation is somewhat arbitrary and does not answer the central
question of whether this information should play a role in deter-
mining the sentence.
B. Tim SIGNIFICANCE OF CHOOsING BETWEEN CHARGE- AND
REAL-OFFENSE SENTENCING
A complex web of factors confronts a sentencing commission
in deciding whether to rely on a charge-offense oriented ap-
proach, or to incorporate some or many real-offense elements. A
fundamental starting point is to settle upon the purpose or pur-
poses to be served at sentencing.28 Real-offense elements do not
have an intrinsically valid function at sentencing. Their utility
depends upon the sentencing philosophy they are designed to
serve. Some real-offense elements may play important roles in a
variety of sentencing rationales, while others that are central
under one doctrine may be largely irrelevant under another.
For example, the defendant's criminal history will likely matter
less, if at all, in a system guided by just deserts than in a system
embracing a utilitarian principle such as deterrence or incapaci-
tation.29 A coherent approach to narrowing the broad range of
possible sentencing information first requires articulating a sen-
tencing rationale.
The importance of the distinction between real- and charge-
offense sentencing becomes more apparent when one considers
the goals of sentencing reform. One of the primary aims of re-
cent sentencing reform efforts, including the Federal Sentencing
28. An extended discussion of the purposes at sentencing is beyond the
scope of this article. For a more in-depth discussion of such purposes, see Marc
Miller, Purposes At Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 413 (1992).
29. In general, a retributivist will focus much more heavily on offense facts,
while a utilitarian will also be quite interested in offender characteristics. See,
e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIuMINAL LAw 460-66 (1978); RICHARD G.
SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT ch. 5
(1979).
[Vol. 78:403412
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Reform Act of 1984,30 has been the reduction of unwarranted
disparity.3 ' To reduce unwarranted disparity, reformers must
increase uniformity and proportionality.32 That is, sentencing
guidelines should impose comparable sentences on similar of-
fenders committing similar offenses, while imposing appropri-
ately different punishmnent on criminal conduct of varying
severity. A successful sentencing reform effort should seek to
maximize both uniformity and proportionality. The difficulty of
this task is reflected in the characteristics of charge- and real-
offense sentencing.
Charge-offense sentencing, in theory, fosters uniformity and
consistency. Grounding the sentence in the offense of conviction
limits the factors that make up a sentencing decision and elimi-
nates the need for complex or time-consuming sentencing proce-
dures, which may inhibit uniformity by straining judicial
resources and inviting error.
Uniformity, however, can come at the expense of proportion-
ality. Imposing the same sentence on all convicted defendants,
regardless of the nature of the offense and the offender, achieves
perfect uniformity, but is bizarrely disproportional. 33 Charge-
30. Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1988)).
31. Avoiding or reducing unwarranted disparity was one of the principle
goals of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988);
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
32. Disparity is sometimes defined in the limited sense of similar cases re-
ceiving different sentences. See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discre-
tion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CFnn. L. & CRImNOLOGY
883, 933 (1990) ("The term disparity, in the sentencing context, is generally
used to refer to a pattern of unlike sentences for like offenders.") (citation omit-
ted). Efforts to achieve uniformity address this form of disparity by seeking to
impose roughly equivalent sentences in similar cases. This is only half of the
equation, though, because the comprehensive goal of sentencing reform is to
ensure that most cases receive appropriate sentences. To attain this goal it is
equally important that cases of differing severity receive appropriately different
sentences. Thus, a more sophisticated approach to disparity is concerned with
proportionality, as well as uniformity. See id. at 932-35; Daniel J. Freed, Fed-
eral Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discre-
tion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1704 (1992) ("An essential component of
solving the problem of unwarranted disparity lies in distinguishing between
like cases, which ought to be sentenced similarly, and unlike cases, which ought
to be sentenced in proportion to their greater or lesser seriousness."); see also
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem
is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. Cmm. L. REv. 833 (1992) (concluding that
undue uniformity, not excessive disparity, is an important current problem).
33. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1A3 ("Simple uniformity - sentencing
every offender to five years - destroys proportionality."); see also Albert W. Al-
1993]
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offense sentencing fails to account for the large variations in
conduct and culpability possible among offenders who have vio-
lated the same statute.3 4 Legislators tend to draw criminal stat-
utes broadly, without detailed categories or distinctions based
on harm or culpability. Many of the factors that influence sen-
tencing decisions are not elements of the offense. For example,
Judge Stephen Breyer, an original member of the United States
Sentencing Commission and a principal architect of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, wrote the following:
A bank robber, for example, might, or might not, use a gun; he might
take a little, or a lot, of money; he might, or might not, injure the teller.
The typical armed robbery statute, however, does not distinguish
among these different ways of committing the crime. Nor does such a
statute necessarily distinguish between how cruelly the defendant
treated the victims, whether the victims were especially vulnerable as
a result of their age, or whether the defendant, though guilty, acted
under duress.3
5
A charge-offense system, therefore, may violate the principle of
proportionality by "overaggregating" or treating dissimilar of-
fenders alike.
According to conventional wisdom, a second shortcoming of
charge-offense oriented sentencing is that it shifts sentencing
discretion to the prosecutor.3 6 Because the prosecutor selects
the charges and the judge fixes the sentence according to the
offense of conviction, charge-offense sentencing enables the
prosecutor to determine, or at least predict with great accuracy,
whether a defendant will receive a short or long sentence if con-
victed or whether two similarly situated defendants will receive
uniform or disparate sentences. Such heightened prosecutorial
power is disturbing for several reasons. First, prosecutors are
interested advocates in the criminal justice system, a position
that seems incompatible with the sentencing function. In addi-
schuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58
U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 916 (1991) (commenting that sentencing all offenders alike
would not conform to most understandings of equal justice).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1099 n.15 (3d Cir.
1990) (opining that "it is self-evident that an internationally trained terrorist
who is bent on murdering scores of innocent civilians should be sentenced far
more severely than a duly licensed explosives merchant who knows that one of
his customers intends to blow up an abandoned warehouse in order to commit
insurance fraud, even if each of these defendants is convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(d) for transporting explosives 'with the knowledge or intent that [they]
will be used to kill... any individual or unlawfully to... destroy any building").
35. Breyer, supra note 4, at 9-10.
36. See, e.g., Tonry, Real Offense, supra note 6, at 1562 (arguing that "if
guidelines prescribe specific offenses, the power to initiate or dismiss charges is
the power to determine sentence").
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tion, because the prosecutor's charging decision is essentially
unreviewable, 37 this intensified authority may be used arbitrar-
ily, in order to coerce guilty pleas or reward favored defendants.
Finally, this increased prosecutorial power can greatly undercut
a charge-offense system's supposed gains in promoting uniform-
ity. If the prosecutor can determine the sentence by selecting
the charge, sentencing guidelines can be manipulated or circum-
vented. This can reintroduce disparity, because factors other
than neutral characteristics of the offense and the offender may
come into play.
Advocates of real-offense sentencing contend that it avoids
these serious drawbacks of charge-offense sentencing.38 They
argue that by taking into consideration all of the facts relevant
to the offense and the offender, a real-offense sentence will more
fully reflect the defendant's true culpability, furthering propor-
tionality. A real-offense system will also diminish the prosecu-
tor's role in sentencing and the impact of plea bargaining.3 9
Because the judge bases the sentence on the defendant's "real"
conduct, regardless of the offense of conviction, the prosecutor's
actions have only a limited effect on the sentence. This reduces
unwarranted disparity by ensuring that similar defendants re-
ceive similar sentences regardless of the prosecutor's charging
and bargaining decisions.
Objections to real-offense sentencing generally fall into two
categories: fairness and effectiveness. 40 Critics contend that
real-offense sentencing is manifestly unfair,4 ' if not unconstitu-
37. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (indicat-
ing that "whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion").
38. For summaries and critical discussions of the arguments in favor of
real-offense sentencing, see Reitz, supra note 13, at 553-65; Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 733, 757-72 (1980);
Tonry & Coffee, supra note 19, at 152-63.
39. See MODEL AcT, supra note 6, § 3-206(d) cmt. (stating that real-offense
sentencing is designed "to reduce the impact of plea bargaining on the sentenc-
ing process").
40. See Tonry, Real Offense, supra note 6, at 1564 ("The fundamental flaws
of real offense sentencing are easily stated. The most basic are that it is incom-
patible with the basic values of our legal system and that it will not work.");
Tonry & Coffee, supra note 19, at 152-163.
41. See Tonry, Real Offense, supra note 6, at 1564-69 (arguing that real
offense sentencing undermines the importance of the substantive criminal law,
nullifies the law of evidence, and conflicts with the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt). Recently, Kevin Reitz has made a forceful case against
real offense sentencing on fairness grounds. See Reitz, supra note 13, at 547-
65; see also, Stephen J. Schulhofer, supra note 38, 765-68 (1980) (opining that
"a sentencing system that permits conflicting policies to be pursued by in-
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tional.42 Defendants in such a regime are sentenced based on
facts not proved at trial or admitted as part of a guilty plea. In-
deed, the sentence may be aggravated based on conduct for
which the defendant has been acquitted.43 The sentencing judge
may have found these sentencing facts by a mere preponderance
of the evidence, without many of the procedural protections ap-
plicable to determinations of guilt or innocence. The defendant
may be deprived of the anticipated benefit of a plea agreement,
as dismissed charges are reintroduced at the sentencing stage.44
This sacrifice of fairness is particularly hard to justify if a
real-offense system fails even to achieve its stated aims. Critics
suggest that the promise of real-offense sentencing is illusory
because such a system is unworkable. 45 Real-offense sentencing
dependent authorities, prosecutors on the one hand and sentencing or parole
officials on the other, seems vulnerable to multiple constitutional objections").
42. See, e.g., Tonry, Real Offense, supra note 6, at 1577-80 (arguing that
real-offense sentencing under the Model Act is probably unconstitutional).
Real-offense sentencing has a long history of acceptance by the courts. See,
e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard satisfies due process requirements for considera-
tion of real-offense evidence in sentencing); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949) (upholding sentencing court's reliance on a variety of real offense ele-
ments). Some commentators have argued that because of the changed nature of
sentencing in the era of sentencing guidelines, Williams and McMillan are of
limited precedential value, and real-offense sentencing may, in fact, be uncon-
stitutional. See, e.g., Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing:
No End to Disparity, 28 AM. Cium. L. REv. 161, 210-20 (1991); Susan N. Her-
man, The Tail That Wagged The Dog: Bifurcated Factfinding Under the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines And The Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REv.
289, 311-14, 337-39 (1992); Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1179, 1208-18 (1993); Richard Husseini, Comment, The Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines: Adopting Clear and Convincing Evidence as the
Burden of Proof, 57 U. Cm. L. Rv. 1387, 1399-1406 (1990) (arguing that the
preponderance-of-evidence standard for real-offense determinations may be un-
constitutional). But see Reitz, supra note 13, at 542-46 (suggesting that the
Supreme Court is likely to continue to apply Williams and McMillan).
The courts have generally upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines'
real-offense provisions. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899
F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844 (1990) (rejecting due process
and double jeopardy challenges); Lear, supra, at 1208-18. The courts have also
continued to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard. See, e.g., Rodri-
guez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d at 182. But see United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d
1084, 1100-01 (3d Cir. 1990) (requiring at least clear and convincing evidence to
support 22-level upward departure).
43. See supra note 22.
44. Tonry, Real Offense, supra note 6, at 1575-77 ("Real offense sentencing
would involve a form of misrepresentation that would not be tolerated in most
marketplaces.").
45. For a discussion of the tension between the need for workability and
the value of complexity in a comprehensive sentencing system, see Paul H.
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can easily lead to unmanageable complexity as judges must de-
termine all of the "real" facts relevant to sentencing. Errors in
the application of complex sentencing rules can reintroduce dis-
parity. Prosecutors and defense attorneys may "circumvent the
guidelines by developing new plea bargaining patterns."46 Real-
offense sentencing also depends upon the judge receiving com-
plete and accurate information concerning the offense and the
offender. Accordingly, a real-offense system is vulnerable to in-
adequate information gathering, which may be caused by a lack
of resources or a willingness by the parties to "hide" facts from
the court. If the impact of plea bargaining is in fact severely
restricted, the system may be paralyzed if many more defend-
ants opt to go to trial, rather than plead guilty.4 7
In sum, the choice between real- and charge-offense sen-
tencing is difficult and perplexing. In theory, each system fur-
thers some of the goals of sentencing reform, but inhibits others.
Moreover, serious questions persist about the gap between the
theory and the reality of each approach.
C. TiE ROLE OF REAL-OFFENSE SENTENCING IN NON-
GUIDELINE SENTENCING SYSTEMS
Real-offense sentencing is not a creation of the Sentencing
Commission. It has long been a part of traditional American
sentencing systems, such as the federal regime that existed
before the introduction of the Guidelines. 48 This fact has led
some to suggest that the Sentencing Commission's adoption of
real-offense sentencing simply formalizes the pre-existing judi-
cial approach to sentencing.49 This argument is misleading and
Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 Tax L. REv. 1, 10-12
(1987); see also Ronald F. Wright, Complexity and Distrust in Sentencing
Guidelines, 25 U.C. DAvis L. Rav. 617 (1992) (arguing that the Guidelines' com-
plexity may be a necessary evil, and that simplification must be approached
cautiously).
46. Tonry, supra note 6, at 1570; see also id. at 1571-73 (suggesting other
ways parties may circumvent real-offense guidelines).
47. Id. at 1570.
48. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 38, at 765-68.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1989)
(interpreting "Guideline § 1B1.3 to require courts to take account of'relevant
conduct' - conduct that, very roughly speaking, corresponds to those actions
and circumstances that courts typically took into account when sentencing prior
to the Guidelines' enactment."); Wilkins & Steer, supra note 5, at 516 (stating
that the Sentencing Commission's decision to include in the Guidelines offenses
for which defendant was not convicted "simply formalizes the pre-Guidelines
practice of considering the full range of a defendant's conduct for sentencing
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understates the radical nature of the Sentencing Commission's
compromise.
Federal sentencing before the Guidelines, like the systems
that continue to exist in many states,50 is best described as in-
corporating discretionary or permissive real-offense sentencing.
One of the defining features of the pre-Guidelines federal system
was that judges exercised largely unfettered discretion in select-
ing a punishment within broad statutory limits.5 ' This discre-
tion extended to deciding which, if any, real-offense elements
would be considered.52 Most judges believed in at least some as-
pects of real-offense sentencing and ordinarily tried to base the
sentence on a complete picture of the defendant, the crimes he or
she had committed, and any relevant aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. 53
It is important to note the limited nature of this real-offense
sentencing. A judge in the former federal system was not re-
quired to take into account any real-offense behavior, as would
be the case with binding sentencing guidelines incorporating
real-offense sentencing. One judge might opt for a charge-of-
fense approach by imposing five years imprisonment on all bank
robbers, while another might consider the circumstances of the
case or the defendant's background and record. Judges who
agreed on the relevance of certain real-offense elements might
not agree on the weight to be given such factors. The impact of
real-offense elements was also not rigid and predetermined. A
judge inclined to consider a real-offense fact might "discount"
that fact depending upon the apparent strength of the govern-
ment's evidence, or the fact that the defendant pleaded guilty.
Further, individual judges did not necessarily rely on the same
purposes, regardless of whether all of such criminal activity was encompassed
within counts of conviction").
50. For a partial survey of real-offense practices in the states, see Reitz,
supra note 13, at 528 n.22.
51. For background on the history of American sentencing practices up to
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, see Nagel, supra note 32, at 887-99.
52. See Reitz, supra note 13, at 528 (indicating that "nearly every state
allows sentencing courts to engage freely in real-offense sentencing as a matter
of discretion").
53. The authors of a thoughtful study on the sentencing of white collar of-
fenders found that most judges believe to some extent in real-offense sentenc-
ing. See, WHEELER Er AL., supra note 23, at 17-18, 30-36. For example, one
judge acknowledged to the authors being interested in "the total picture of what
was going on, not in the slice selected by the prosecution for inclusion in the
indictment." Id. at 17; see also Schulhofer, supra note 38, at 757 (stating that
available evidence suggests that judges rely on real-offense sentencing).
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types of real-offense elements, or give them the same weight,
from case to case. 54
Real-offense sentencing was therefore sporadic and unpre-
dictable. It was also part and parcel of an offender-based, reha-
bilitative-oriented penology that was largely rejected by the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Guidelines. 55 Real-of-
fense sentencing's apparently secure place in the pre-Guidelines
world does not necessarily justify mandatory real-offense guide-
lines. Far from being a simple formalization of past practice, the
Sentencing Commission's version of real-offense sentencing,
which incorporates criminal offense characteristics 56 as well as
alleged more-serious-offenses 57 and alleged related-offenses, 58 is
a radical measure which reaches far beyond any state guideline
system.59
D. PLEA BARGAINNG AND REAL-OFFENSE SENTENCING
The reality of plea bargaining exerts a powerful influence on
the conflict between real- and charge-offense sentencing. A sig-
nificant part of the appeal of real-offense sentencing is its poten-
tial to minimize the impact of plea bargaining on sentencing.60
A real-offense system, however, is itself vulnerable to manipula-
tive plea bargaining.61 This is true in part because, in many re-
spects, there exists a fundamental tension between plea
bargaining and sentencing guidelines. The parties engaged in
plea bargaining do not share sentencing reformers' goal of re-
ducing unwarranted sentencing disparity. Prosecutors ordina-
rily care less about disparity than with obtaining a conviction
and a generally satisfactory sentence. 62 The defendant does not
54. This ability to dispense with real-offense sentencing appears to have
played a major role in shaping plea bargaining in the pre-Guidelines federal
criminal justice system. See infra part H.D.
55. Commentators also argue that the shift from a discretionary to a
mandatory real-offense system, in combination with the shift away from of-
fender-based sentencing undermines the constitutional legitimacy of the Guide-
lines' structure. See Herman, supra note 42, at 301-304.
56. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 111-140 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 141, 224, 244, 258.
60. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM.
Ciun. L. lv. 231, 283 (1989) (interview data suggests that one reason prosecu-
tors have sometimes agreed to manipulate Guidelines through plea bargaining
is that they "focused upon maximizing their conviction rate, but were not ori-
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care at all about disparity. In fact, in a sense the defendant ac-
tively seeks disparity, because his or her aim is to receive a
lighter sentence than that imposed on similarly situated offend-
ers. A sentencing guideline system that is serious about reduc-
ing unwarranted disparity must therefore attempt to regulate
and control plea bargaining.
The utility of plea bargaining depends in large part upon
the value of the inducement the prosecutor can offer a defendant
for pleading guilty. The more the defendant stands to gain, the
more likely he or she will be to enter a guilty plea. 63 Similarly,
the more the prosecutor has to offer the defendant, the more au-
thority the prosecutor has to encourage a guilty plea and influ-
ence the sentence. A powerful inducement for charge
bargaining, 64 historically the main form of bargaining in the fed-
eral system, exists in a charge-offense system, and the induce-
ment theoretically diminishes the more the system becomes
real-offense oriented. In a pure charge-offense system, the of-
fense of conviction determines the sentence. In such a system
charge bargaining is extremely attractive to the defendant be-
cause a guilty plea can result in a significant reduction in the
sentence applicable to a conviction on the dropped charges. The
prosecutor, in turn, acquires a great deal of power to convince
the defendant to plead guilty, because by dropping or reducing
charges, the prosecutor can effectively determine the ultimate
sentence.6 5
ented toward maximizing the severity of the sentences they obtained.... Na-
tional uniformity, certainty or reduced disparity are not goals which they
embrace.").
63. See Tonry & Coffee, supra note 19, at 146-52 (discussing guidelines'
effect on plea bargaining in terms of available inducements and defendants' tol-
eration of risk).
64. Charge bargaining occurs when the defendant agrees to plead guilty to
either fewer counts or less serious charges than the prosecutor has brought
against the defendant. Thus the bargaining concerns the counts to which a de-
fendant pleads, not the ultimate sentence. Sentence bargaining, in contrast,
concerns the ultimate sentence, and is designed to result in a sentence agree-
ment that is binding if the judge accepts the agreement, or a sentence recom-
mendation by the prosecutor that does not bind the judge.
65. Some commentators suggest that the power of the entire plea bargain-
ing process, not just the power of the prosecutor, is enhanced in a charge-of-
fense system. See Reitz, supra note 13, at 562. Nonetheless, the result is
increased pressure on the defendant to plea guilty, a situation of which the
prosecutor can take advantage. See Tonry & Coffee, supra note 19, at 146-47;
see also Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A
Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U.
PA. L. Rxv. 550 (1978) (arguing that reform is likely to produce a system compa-
rable to the current sentencing regime, in which discretion is concentrated in
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In contrast, the formal offense of conviction only determines
the statutory maximum sentence in a real-offense system. Be-
yond that limitation, the judge bases the sentence on the defend-
ant's actual conduct, however that is defined, regardless of the
offense of conviction. Charge bargaining may therefore be of lit-
tle use in a real-offense system because the presumptive sen-
tence may not be significantly affected by the dismissal of
counts. If true, this fact significantly reduces the prosecutor's
ability to encourage guilty pleas, and to influence or determine
the sentence, in a real-offense system.
It is appropriate to consider why charge bargaining was
widely used in the pre-Guidelines federal system, with its per-
missive real-offense character. At first blush, it might seem that
charge bargaining would not be a useful device in such a system,
because a reduction in charges would not necessarily affect the
judge's decision. Nevertheless, the parties shared an expecta-
tion that if the prosecution dropped counts in exchange for a
guilty plea, the defendant would receive a lesser sentence than
might otherwise be imposed. What seems to account for that
perception, which was by and large an accurate one,66 is that in
a variety of ways the parties were able to introduce charge-of-
fense aspects into the sentencing process. It is important to re-
member that although federal judges had the freedom to use
real-offense information in imposing sentences, they were not
required to do so. 6 7 Thus if the judge agreed, explicitly or tac-
itly, to ignore or give diminished attention to dropped counts, a
charge bargain could accomplish a great deal. This seems to
have gone on, although the parties were almost always uncer-
tain about what the value of the plea would be.68 Furthermore,
the parties were able to add a charge-offense aspect by withhold-
the prosecutor's office, and in which the benefits of this discretion are made
available only to defendants who sacrifice their constitutional rights).
66. The Sentencing Commission's studies revealed that before the Guide-
lines, defendants who pleaded guilty received, on average, sentences thirty to
forty percent lower than defendants who were convicted at trial. U.S. SENTENC-
ING COMMISSION, SuPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 48 (1987) [hereinafter COMMISSION,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT).
67. See supra part 11.C.
68. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-
TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 389-90 (1991) [hereinafter
COMMISSION, OPERATION REPORT].
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ing relevant information from the judge.69 As long as the infor-
mation upon which the judge based the sentence came primarily
from the government, the prosecutor's willingness not to draw
the judge's attention to aggravating factors would contribute (al-
beit, again, to an unknowable extent) to a lesser sentence.
Charge bargaining, although a hidden and uncertain pro-
cess, seems to have been able to take advantage of the flexible
nature of the old system. This suggests that real-offense sys-
tems remain vulnerable to the effects of plea bargaining. As this
article discusses later, the workings of this process have impor-
tant implications for charge bargaining under the Guidelines,
with its real-offense aspects designed to limit the impact of plea
bargaining.
III. WHAT THE SENTENCING COMMISSION DID
Faced with the necessity of attempting to resolve the con-
flict between "procedural and substantive fairness" 70 posed by
charge- and real-offense sentencing, and given little or no statu-
tory guidance, 7 ' the Sentencing Commission understandably
chose neither extreme, opting instead for a middle course. After
initially considering guidelines that were very much real-offense
oriented,7 2 the Sentencing Commission settled on a system that,
69. See COMMISSION, SuPPLEmNTARY REPORT, supra note 66, at 48 (argu-
ing that "anecdotal evidence indicates that the parties may sometimes also
agree to suppress relevant facts, thereby making a lower sentence likely").
70. Breyer, supra note 4, at 9.
71. See, e.g., Nagel, supra, note 31, at 913 (indicating that Congress left the
choice between real- and charge-offense system to the Sentencing Commission);
Wilkins & Steer, supra note 5, at 501 (noting that the House of Representatives
version of sentencing reform rejected real-offense sentencing except in some
plea-bargaining arrangements, while the Senate version, which ultimately be-
came the Sentencing Reform Act, "did not expressly specify, [but] seemed to
lean toward a real offense system").
A panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals initially ruled that the
Guidelines' real-offense provisions exceeded the Sentencing Commission's au-
thority under the Sentencing Reform Act. United States v. Galloway, 943 F.2d
897, 899-905 (8th Cir. 1991). The Eighth Circuit, en banc, later reversed this
decision. United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414 (1992) cert. denied, 113 S.Ct.
1420 (1993).
72. The Sentencing Commission published, and received public comment
on, two draft versions of guidelines prior to promulgating the final guidelines in
April 1987. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY DRAFT SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES (1986); U.S. SENTENCING CoMMIssIoN, REVISED DRAFT SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES (1987). The 1986 draft was more real-offense oriented
than the final guidelines, while the 1987 draft was more charge-offense ori-
ented. For a discussion of the process of drafting the Guidelines see Nagel,
supra note 32, at 914-25.
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according to Judge Breyer, reflects an attempt to "have some
real- elements, but not so many that it becomes unwieldy or pro-
cedurally unfair."73
The following sections describe the nature and extent of the
Guidelines' incorporation of real-offense elements. Before pro-
ceeding, however, it is important to note what the Sentencing
Commission did not do. It did not base its decisions about the
appropriate scope of sentencing information, or any other impor-
tant decision, on a view of the goals at sentencing. The Sentenc-
ing Commission expressly declined to choose between, or
attempt to synthesize, just deserts and crime control philoso-
phies, claiming the following:
A clear-cut Commission decision in favor of one of these approaches
would diminish the chance that the guidelines would find the wide-
spread acceptance they need for effective implementation. As a practi-
cal matter, in most sentencing decisions both philosophies may prove
consistent with the same result.74
This decision, for which the Sentencing Commission has been
severely criticized,75 makes it unduly difficult to discern the rea-
sons why the Commission accepted or rejected any particular
real-offense element.
A. OFFENSE INFORMATION
1. Offense Characteristics
The Guidelines rely extensively on offense characteristics.
This policy is manifested in the "specific offense characteristics"
applicable to individual offense guidelines, and the "adjust-
ments" in Chapter Three of the Guidelines, which are applicable
to all offenses. 76 Specific offense characteristics and adjust-
ments are aggravating, or occasionally, mitigating factors to the
offense. They are not generally elements of the offense and con-
sequently they are not admitted as part of a guilty plea nor must
the prosecutor prove them at trial. The Guidelines draw no
distinction between criminal and noncriminal offense
characteristics.
73. Breyer, supra note 4, at 11.
74. U.S. SENTENCING COmMssIoN, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN-
UAL ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1989 edition). The Sentencing Commission subsequently
deleted this language. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, amend. 307.
75. See Miller, supra note 28, at 437-50; Andrew von Hirsch, Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines: Do They Provide Principled Guidance?, 27 AM. Cnm . L.
Ruv. 367, 370-73 (1989).
76. Section 1BI.1 sets forth the instructions for applying the Guidelines.
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.1.
1993]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:403
Examples of offense characteristics include: the amount of
money a defendant convicted of embezzlement received,
77
whether that defendant engaged in more than minimal plan-
ning,78 whether a defendant convicted of a narcotics offense pos-
sessed a dangerous weapon, 79 or whether a money launderer
knew or believed that the funds laundered were the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity.80 Significant adjustments include
whether the defendant selected a particularly vulnerable vic-
tim,"' or whether the defendant had an aggravating 2 or miti-
gating8 3 role in the offense.
In an attempt to control the level of complexity in the
Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission did not seek to identify
and include every possible aggravating and mitigating factor;
rather, the Guidelines include only those factors that, based on
the Commission's study of past cases,8 4 occur with some fre-
quency. 5 The Guidelines recommend that judges consider unu-
sual aggravating and mitigating factors, like a death resulting
from the offense,86 by departing from the Guidelines.8 7
77. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
78. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(5).
79. Id. § 2Dl.1(b)(1).
80. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2Sl.1(b)(1).
81. Id. § 3A1.1.
82. Id. § 3B1.l.
83. Id. § 3B1.2.
84. The Sentencing Commission's use of data concerning past sentencing
practice is discussed in Nagel, supra note 32, at 927-32. Commissioner Paul
Robinson criticized this reliance in his dissent from the Guidelines. See U.S.
SENTENCING COMMISSION, DISSENTING VIEW OF COMMISSIONER PAUL H. ROBIN-
SON ON THE PROMULGATION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES BY THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMISSION 4-6 (1987).
85. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 32, at 923 (stating that specific offense char-
acteristics were determined in part by "empirical analysis of past sentencing
practices [which] showed that judges routinely distinguished one offender con-
victed of the base offense from another on the basis of such a characteristic").
86. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K2.1 ("If death resulted, the court may
increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range.").
87. Departures from the Guidelines are governed by § 3553(b) of Title 18,
which authorizes a departure sentence if "there exists an aggravating or miti-
gating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consid-
eration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); see also U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K2.0. For a useful
analysis of the evolving case law concerning departures from the Guidelines,
see Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Depar-
ture Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1 (1991).
Commissioner Paul Robinson argued in his dissent from the Guidelines
that by inviting departures rather than incorporating all relevant sentencing
factors into the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission violated its statutory
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2. Alleged More-Serious-Offenses
Application of the Guidelines begins with the offense of con-
viction, which determines the applicable offense guideline, in-
cluding the base offense level and the potential list of specific
offense characteristics.88 The court is not free to unilaterally de-
termine that because the defendant actually committed an of-
fense more serious than the offense of conviction, a different,
more severe guideline should apply.89 Although this would ap-
pear to represent a rejection of alleged more-serious-offense
real-offense sentencing, such a characterization of the Guide-
lines is somewhat misleading. There is an exception to the gen-
eral rule that states that "in the case of a plea agreement
containing a stipulation that specifically establishes a more-seri-
ous-offense than the offense of conviction," the court is to apply
the guideline applicable to the stipulated offense. 90 The parties
can, in effect, stipulate that the court should sentence the de-
fendant based on a more-serious-offense than the offense of
conviction.91
mandate and invited disparity. See Robinson, supra note 84, at 13-16; see also,
Robinson, supra note 45, at 15-16 (arguing that a system that only mandates a
few factors and gives judges substantial discretion will suffer from the same
sentence disparity that prompted the current movement toward sentencing
reform).
88. Section 1B1.2(a) directs the court to select the offense guideline from
Chapter Two that is "most applicable to the offense of conviction (i.e., the of-
fense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which
the defendant was convicted)." U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § IB1.2(a). A Statutory
Index assists the judge in selecting the appropriate guideline, but if more than
one guideline is referenced in the Statutory Index, or if the referenced guideline
does not adequately describe the conduct for which the defendant was con-
victed, § 1B1.2(a) requires the court to select the most appropriate guideline.
Id. § 1B1.2(a) app. A; see, e.g., United States v. Obiuwevbi, 962 F.2d 1236, 1242
(7th Cir. 1992) (defendant convicted of making false statements properly sen-
tenced under guideline for currency reporting crime rather than fraud guideline
ordinarily applicable to false statements statute); United States v. Beard, 913
F.2d 193, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1990) (defendant properly sentenced under fraud and
deceit guideline rather than pejury guideline for making false statement under
penalty of peijury in bankruptcy proceeding); THomAs W. HuTcmsoN & DAVID
YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTEcNG LAW AND PRACTICE 21-22 (1989) (discussing the
standards for choice of offense guideline).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a district court may consider only the count of conviction, not de-
fendant's relevant conduct under Guideline section 1B1.2, in selecting the most
applicable guideline).
90. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.2(a); see Wilkins & Steer, supra note 5, at
501 (describing the origin of this exception).
91. See United States v. Braxton, 111 S.Ct. 1854 (1991) (narrowly inter-
preting Guideline § 1B1.2(a)'s proviso).
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More important, because the offense Guidelines are generic
in nature, addressing categories of criminal conduct rather than
specific statutes,9 2 in many instances the Guideline provisions
applicable to an offense are identical to the provisions applicable
to a more-serious-offense. For example, a defendant charged
with assaulting a federal officer with a dangerous weapon93
might enter into a plea agreement with the government to drop
the allegation concerning the dangerous weapon. As this would
reduce the applicable maximum sentence,9 4 the defendant
might expect to receive a corresponding reduction in the sen-
tencing guideline range. Because the same guideline applies to
the two charges,95 however, the court would still increase the
guideline score if it finds that the defendant possessed or used a
weapon.96
In addition, even if a lesser offense is covered by a separate
guideline, the offense level may be identical to that applicable to
the more-serious-offense, depending on the judge's view of the
defendant's "real" conduct. For example, a defendant might ini-
tially be charged with tax evasion and plead guilty to making a
false statement on his tax return, an offense with a lower statu-
tory maximum penalty than tax evasion.97 Nonetheless, if the
sentencing court concludes that the "the offense was committed
in order to facilitate evasion of a tax," the guideline range will be
identical to that for tax evasion.9 8
Such applications of alleged more-serious-offense real-of-
fense sentencing are the exception rather than the rule under
the Guidelines. 99 The appearance of this form of real-offense
92. There is one fraud guideline, not a separate guideline for each statute
prohibiting some form of fraud. See Wilkins & Steer, supra note 5, at 500.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) (1988).
94. The maximum term of imprisonment for assaulting a federal officer
with a dangerous weapon is ten years. Id. The maximum term of imprison-
ment if no dangerous weapon is used is three years. 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) (1988).
95. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2A2.2.
96. Id. § 2A2.2(b)(2).
97. Tax evasion carries a maximum term of imprisonment of five years. 26
U.S.C. § 7201 (1988). The maximum term for making a false statement on a
tax return is three years. 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (1988).
98. Tax evasion is covered by Guideline Section 2T1.1. U.S.S.G., supra
note 2, § 2T1.1. False statements are covered by Section 2T1.3. Id. § 2T1.3.
Under § 2T1.3(a)(1), however, the base offense level is taken from the tax table
in § 2T4.1, the same source for the base offense level for tax evasion, if "the
offense was committed in order to facilitate evasion of a tax." Id. § 2T1.3(a)(1).
99. There appears to be a recent trend towards greater use of alleged more-
serious-offense sentencing in the Guidelines. The Commission has required
such sentencing for several additional offenses. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1,
amend. 320, 444, 448.
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sentencing is apparently haphazard, because the Sentencing
Commission has not explained its approach.100 Contrary to
what one might expect, the Guidelines offer no guidance as to
why defendants are sometimes, but not always, sentenced based
on alleged criminal conduct that is more serious than the offense
of conviction.
B. OFFENDER INFORMATION
1. Offender Characteristics
The Guidelines take a restrictive view of offender character-
istics. They generally instruct judges to give only limited con-
sideration to offender characteristics that have historically
played a role in sentencing, such as age, education, mental and
emotional conditions, drug or alcohol dependence, employment
record, community ties, and family ties and responsibilities.
The Sentencing Commission has not really explained this posi-
tion, but it seems to have been motivated by fears of disparity
and discrimination resulting from consideration of such fac-
tors,101 and by the Sentencing Commission's adoption of a
"harm-based penology."10 2
2. Criminal History
The defendant's criminal history does play a significant role
under the Guidelines. Chapter Four of the Guidelines attaches
a score to the defendant's history of criminal conviction, which
attempts to measure the "frequency, recency, and seriousness"
of the defendant's prior criminal conduct.' 03 This score becomes
the horizontal axis on the Guidelines' sentencing table. 10 4 The
defendant's alleged criminal history is not specifically incorpo-
rated into the Guidelines, but the Commission invites sentenc-
ing judges to impose a harsher sentence than that called for by
the Guidelines if "reliable information indicates that the crimi-
nal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness
100. See infra, part IV.B. This is unfortunately true of much of the Sentenc-
ing Commission's work.
101. See Breyer, supra note 4, at 19-20.
102. The Guidelines generally require harm-based, rather than offender-
based sentencing, a limitation for which the Commission has been frequently
criticized. See, e.g., Freed, supra note 32, at 1715-18.
103. Breyer, supra note 4, at 20.
104. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5A (Sentencing Table).
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of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that
the defendant will commit other crimes."' 05
3. Post-Offense Behavior
The Guidelines take post-offense behavior into account in
several important respects. First, application of the Guidelines
is based upon conduct occurring, inter alia, "in the course of at-
tempting to avoid detection or responsibility" for the offense.' 06
In addition, several adjustments from Chapter Three of the
Guidelines measure particular aspects of post-offense behavior.
The defendant receives a two level increase in the offense score
(on average a twenty-five to thirty percent increase in sentence
length) "if the defendant willfiffly obstructed or impeded, or at-
tempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice dur-
ing the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant
offense. " 10 7 Although such conduct could occur prior to or dur-
ing the offense, most forms of obstruction leading to this adjust-
ment, such as perjury, 08 occur after the offense is completed.
Another two level increase applies if the defendant recklessly
endangered another person while fleeing from a law enforce-
ment officer.' 0 9 The defendant may receive a two level reduc-
tion if the defendant "clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense."" 0°
4. Alleged Related-Offenses
Finally, the most controversial aspect of the Guidelines is
probably the Commission's treatment of alleged related-offense
sentencing. The primary governing principle is set forth in the
relevant conduct guideline," referred to by the chairman and
general counsel of the Sentencing Commission as the "corner-
105. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 4A1.3. This provision has been criticized as
an open invitation to sentencing disparity. See Sentencing Guidelines: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Justice of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 326-327 (1987) (statement of Andrew von Hirsch).
106. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3(a).
107. Id. § 3C1.1.
108. The Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of increasing
a defendant's sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for committing perjury while
testifying in his or her own defense. The Court rejected claims that this prac-
tice unduly chills the defendant's right to testify. United States v. Dunnigan,
113 S.Ct. 1111, 1113 (1993).
109. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 3C1.2.
110. Id. § 3E1.1.
111. Id. § 1B1.3.
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stone" of the guideline system.112 According to section
1B1.3(a)(1), a judge applying the Guidelines must consider the
following:
all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, com-
manded, induced, procured, or wilfully caused by the defendant...
that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in
preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid
detection or responsibility for that offense.
1 3
This provision appears to reject alleged related-offense real-of-
fense sentencing by limiting the focus at sentencing to the of-
fense of conviction. The section immediately following this
language indicates, however, that the drafters intended the
Guidelines to take into account much more related real-offense
conduct for most cases. For those offenses for which the applica-
ble guideline primarily bases the offense level on an amount or
quantity involved in the offense, the court determines the of-
fense level based on "all acts and omissions... that were part of
the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the
offense of conviction."" 4 Such offenses"35 include fraud, theft,
tax offenses, narcotics distribution, bribery, counterfeiting, fire-
arms offenses, antitrust violations, and money laundering, and
constitute approximately seventy to eighty percent of the federal
criminal docket."16 For a defendant convicted of one of these of-
fenses, the Guideline sentence is based on all similar alleged of-
fenses in "the same course of conduct or common scheme or
plan," even if the defendant was not charged with the alleged
offenses,"37 such charges were dropped pursuant to a plea agree-
ment," 8 or the defendant was acquitted" 9 of such charges.'
2 0
112. Willdns & Steer, supra note 5, at 496.
113. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3(a)(1).
114. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2).
115. The offenses that are included in § 1B1.3(a)(2) are those identified in
the multiple count grouping rule in § 3D1.2(d). See U.S.S.G., supra note 1,
§ 1B1.3(a)(2).
116. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 53, tbl. 15
(1992).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495-96 (7th Cir. 1990).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Salva, 902 F.2d 483, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1990).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330, 1332 (7th Cir. 1990).
120. The Ninth Circuit has been a cauldron of controversy, because it has
resisted critical aspects of the Sentencing Commission's real-offense approach.
Initially, a panel of the Ninth Circuit found § 1B1.3 in conflict with the multiple
count rules in Chapter Three and declined to aggregate drug quantities from
alleged related-offenses. United States v. Restreppo, 833 F.2d 781, 786 (9th
Cir. 1989). The panel later reversed itself. United States v. Restreppo, 903 F.2d
648 (9th Cir. 1990) affd en banc, 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 112
S.Ct. 1564 (1992). The court has continued, however, to impose significant re-
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A sentencing system that plans to take into account alleged
related-offenses must define the nature of the relationship be-
tween the conviction and alleged offenses that will cause the al-
leged offenses to be considered at sentencing. The defining and
limiting concept in the Guidelines' version of alleged related-of-
fense real-offense sentencing is the phrase "same course of con-
duct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."
121
Although the Guidelines do not define this phrase, the drafters
seem to have designed it to identify those alleged offenses that
are linked in some important way to the offense of conviction.
The chairman and general counsel of the Sentencing Commis-
sion have explored the meaning of this phrase in a much-cited
article.122 In their view, the clause "common scheme or plan" is
closely analogous to the provision of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure pertaining to joinder of offenses, 123 which sug-
gests a focus "on the connection between the offenses in terms of
time interval, common accomplices, common victims, similar
modus operandi, or other evidence of a common criminal en-
deavor involving separate criminal acts."124 The authors fur-
strictions on real-offense sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Castro-
Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that courts cannot
base upward departure in robbery case on additional alleged robberies that
were dismissed as part of plea agreement); United States v. Faulkner, 934 F.2d
190, 193 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that courts cannot base upward departure in
robbery case on uncharged robberies); United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844,
851 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that courts cannot base upward departure on ac-
quitted conduct).
More recently, the Ninth Circuit has distinguished between offenses such
as robbery and offenses subject to alleged related-offense sentencing under
§§ 1B1.3 and 3D1.2. In United States v. Fine a panel applied the rule from
Castro-Cervantes to a mail fraud case, an offense where alleged related-offense
sentencing is required by § 1B1.3. After a rehearing en banc, however, the
court reversed itself and, aligning itself with all of the other courts of appeals,
held that for offenses covered by §§ 1B1.3(a)(2) and 3D1.2(d), courts can include
dismissed counts as relevant conduct. United States v. Fine, 946 F.2d 650, 652
(9th Cir. 1991), rev'd in part, remanded in part en banc, 975 F.2d 596, 600 (9th
Cir. 1992).
The Ninth Circuit's approach to these issues is criticized in Steven E. Zip-
perstein, Relevant Conduct and Plea Bargaining, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 223
(1992).
121. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3(a)(2).
122. See Wilkins & Steer, supra note 5, at 515-16. A number of courts have
relied on the authors' explanation in interpreting the relevant conduct provi-
sion. See, e.g., United States v. Bethley, 973 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 1323 (1993); United States v. Santiago, 906 F.2d 867, 872 (2d
Cir. 1990)).
123. FED. R. CrM. P. 8(a).
124. Wilkins & Steer, supra note 5, at 515 (citation omitted). As an exam-
ple, the authors suggest that "multiple embezzlements over a period of time, or
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ther suggest that the other clause, "same course of conduct,"
"contemplates that there be sufficient similarity and temporal
proximity to reasonably suggest that repeated instances of crim-
inal behavior constitute a pattern of criminal conduct."125 Some
courts have recommended a sort of sliding scale of these
components. 126
The impact of the alleged related-offense approach is sub-
stantial.127 For example, if the sentencing judge concludes that
a defendant convicted of one count of fraud involving $10,000
actually committed three frauds totalling $50,000 in the same
course of conduct, the defendant's guideline range would be cal-
culated based on the higher amount. 1 28 The judge also applies
the specific offense characteristics and adjustments based on all
of the offenses included in the same course of conduct. 1 29 Thus,
if in one of the frauds not leading to conviction the defendant
defrauded more than one victim,' ° targeted a vulnerable vic-
tim,13 1 or played a leadership role,'3 2 the defendant's offense
multiple drug deliveries on different occasions would each be considered part of
a 'common scheme or plan'." Id.
125. Id. at 515-16. The authors give the following example, which contrasts
the two clauses:
[I]f a drug dealer sells heroin to various customers on one day and co-
caine to various customers on the next day, his conduct may or may not
be part of a "common scheme or plan." There can be little doubt, how-
ever, that his conduct is within the "same course of conduct" heading
because of the similarity and close temporal proximity of his illegal ac-
tions. Similarly, a crime spree of larcenies might not fit the definition
of "common scheme or plan," but would be considered part of the "same
course of conduct."
Id. at 516; see also, United States v. Perdomo, 927 F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that the trial court properly included two kilograms of cocaine that
defendant sold in March 1988 in calculating the base offense level for conviction
of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in July 1988 as defendant's crimes were part
of "same course of conduct").
126. See, e.g., United States v. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 1992)
("When one component is absent,... courts must look for a stronger presence of
at least one of the other components.").
127. See Heaney, supra note 37, at 209-10 (finding that in districts studied,
one half of sentences were increased based on uncharged conduct).
128. The fraud guideline, § 2F1.1, provides for an adjustment in the offense
level based on the amount of the loss. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2F1.l(b)(1).
A $10,000 loss increases the offense level two levels, while a $50,000 loss in-
creases the offense level five levels. See id.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Paulk, 917 F.2d 879, 883 (5th Cir. 1990) (en-
hancing the defendant's offense level for possession of firearm although defend-
ant was not convicted of that offense).
130. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2F1.1(b)(2) (providing for a two level
increase).
131. Id. § 3A1.1 (providing for a two-level increase).
132. Id. § 3Bl.1 (providing for a two-, three-, or four-level increase).
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score will be increased despite the lack of a conviction on such
counts. In contrast, a defendant convicted of one count of rob-
bery 133 would not have the amounts of other robberies commit-
ted in the same course of conduct aggregated, because section
3D1.2(d) does not apply to robbery.' 34 Similarly, a judge would
only apply the specific offense characteristics and adjustments
for robbery on the basis of convicted counts.
United States v. Colon'3 5 illustrates the potential impact of
alleged related-offense sentencing under the Guidelines. Colon
plead guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin, possessing heroin
with the intent to distribute, and to other substantive narcotics
offenses. 136 The trial judge originally calculated a sentencing
range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months, based on a finding
that the quantity of heroin the defendant plead guilty to selling
to undercover officers and possessing at the time of his arrest
was approximately seven and one-half grams.137 The Second
Circuit ruled on the first appeal that under the Guidelines the
judge was required to include all quantities of narcotics Colon
sold as part of the same course of conduct as the offenses of con-
viction.138 On remand, the judge based the offense level on the
400 grams of heroin that the judge estimated Colon sold over a
300 day period prior to the offense of conviction. 13 9 The court
then sentenced Colon, within the applicable guideline range, to
a term of fourteen years imprisonment. The Second Circuit af-
firmed this approximate tripling of the applicable sentencing
range based on the inclusion of Colon's alleged related-
offenses. 140
133. See id. § 2B3.1.
134. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 3D1.2(d).
135. United States v. Colon, 961 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Colon
III.
136. Id. at 42.
137. Id.
138. United States v. Colon, 905 F.2d 580, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1990) [hereinafter
Colon 1], remanded for resentencing, sentence affd, 961 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1992).
Originally, the trial judge did not incorporate these amounts in the base offense
level, but did rely on them to justify a substantial upward departure from the
applicable guideline range. Id.
139. Colon II, 961 F.2d at 43.
140. Id.; see also United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 387-89 (2d Cir.
1992), petition for cert. filed sub. nom. United States v. Frias (U.S. June 23,
1993) (increasing the applicable guideline range from 12 to 36 months to 210 to
262 months based upon conduct of which the defendant had been acquitted).
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IV. ALLEGED RELATED-OFFENSE SENTENCING: DID
THE COMMISSION DRAW A WISE LINE?
The mere fact that the Sentencing Commission compro-
mised between the extremes of real- and charge-offense sentenc-
ing does not ensure success. Sometimes it is better not to
compromise, but to choose one option nearly in its entirety. This
is apparently the view of the states that have adopted sentenc-
ing guidelines, all of whom have opted for sytems which are far
more charge-offense oriented than the Guidelines. 141
Even assuming a compromise is in order, the results can be
either elegant or irrational. If two competing alternatives have
attractive and undesirable features, a sound compromise should
capture as many of the benefits of each position as possible,
while limiting the negative consequences of each option. This
delicate task of harmonizing conflicting approaches requires
sound theory and judgment, not simply splitting the difference.
The Sentencing Commission's treatment of alleged related-
offenses is the most controversial aspect of its approach to real-
offense sentencing, and is troubling on a number of levels. The
line the Sentencing Commission drew-between a strong ver-
sion of alleged related-offense sentencing for many offenses and
a much more charge-offense oriented approach for others-re-
quires strikingly different treatment of the two categories of of-
fenses. The Sentencing Commission does not justify these
apparent anomalies. It has offered only a limited, and ulti-
mately unsatisfying, rationale for employing alleged related-of-
fense sentencing at all, and for treating the two categories of
offenses in such a radically different manner. Given this back-
ground, it should not be surprising that the Sentencing Commis-
sion's approach to alleged related-offenses has not worked. Not
only is the unfairness inherent in real-offense sentencing clearly
present, but the very evils this system is designed to avoid re-
141. According to Michael Tonry, all of the states that have adopted sen-
tencing guidelines have rejected real-offense sentencing in favor of a charge-
offense approach. Tonry, supra note 6, at 356-57. Professor Tonry's use of the
term real-offense sentencing is more narrow than the definition employed in
this article. His definition of real-offense sentencing roughly correlates to crim-
inal offense characteristics, alleged more-serious-offenses, and alleged related-
offenses. In this sense, the states have generally rejected real-offense sentenc-
ing. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.370(2) (1988). There are exceptions to
this general rule, however. For a more complete discussion of state practices,
see Reitz, supra note 13, at 535-40.
In addition, states have generally taken a more permissive attitude to-
wards noncriminal offense characteristics. See, e.g., infra note 258 and accom-
panying text.
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main largely undisturbed. In the end, this major component of
the Sentencing Commission's compromise on real-offense sen-
tencing reveals itself to be irrational, pernicious and ineffective.
A. THE IMPACT OF THE GUIDELINES' APPROACH
The Sentencing Commission's basic compromise on alleged
related-offense sentencing is that for one category of offenses,
the type for which the Guideline range is determined largely on
the basis of an amount or quantity, the sentence is based not
solely on the offense of conviction, but also on "all acts and omis-
sions.., that were part of the same course of conduct or common
scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." 142 This rule re-
quires radically different treatment for the two categories of of-
fenses and generates puzzling results.
Imagine that Defendant A has robbed $10,000 from a bank
and Defendant B has sold three grams of cocaine base ("crack").
Both defendants would have an offense level of twenty-two.
143
Now instead assume that each defendant has committed two of-
fenses. Defendant A robbed $10,000 from each of two banks,
and possessed a gun while committing the second offense. De-
fendant B sold three grams of crack on two occasions, and dur-
ing the second offense possessed a gun. Each defendant, if
convicted on both counts, would have a guideline offense level of
twenty-eight.'" If, however, they are each convicted only of the
142. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3(a)(2); see supra part m.B.4.
143. Defendant A's offense level would be calculated starting from the base
offense level for robbery, which is 20. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2B3.1(a).
There is a two-level increase for taking the property of a financial institution.
Id. § 2B3.1(b)(1). There is no adjustment for taking $10,000 or less. Id.
§ 2B3.1(b)(6).
Defendant B's offense level would be calculated based on a "Drug Quantity
Table". Id. § 2D1.1(a)(3). The offense level applicable to three grams of crack is
22. Id. § 2D1.1(c)(11).
144. Defendant A's offense level would be determined starting with the of-
fense level for the first robbery which is 22, as in the previous example. The
offense level for the second robbery is 27 (base offense level of twenty, plus two
levels for taking property of financial institution, plus five levels for possessing
a gun. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 2B3.1(b)(1) & 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), respectively.
Chapter 3, part D of the Guidelines establishes the rules for dealing with multi-
ple counts of conviction. Id. § 3D. Offenses are arranged in one or more
"groups," an offense level is determined for each group, and the final offense
level is determined by taking the group with the highest offense level and in-
creasing it depending upon the number and seriousness of the other groups.
See id. §§ 3D1.2, 3D1.3, & 3D1.4, respectively. Each of Defendant A's robberies
would be a separate group under § 3D1.2 (unless the defendant robbed the
same bank each time and the robberies were "connected by a common criminal
objective" or constituted "part of a common scheme or plan," in which case they
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first offense, their situations are entirely different. Defendant A
would have an offense level of twenty-two, a reduction of six
levels. This is a significant reduction. For a first offender, the
sentencing range for level twenty-eight is seventy-eight to
ninety-seven months of imprisonment. For level twenty-two,
however, the range is only forty-one to fifty-one months. 145
Defendant B, in contrast, would retain an offense level of
twenty-eight. What has happened, in effect, is that if Defendant
A is convicted of only one count of robbery (e.g., because of a
charge bargain or an acquittal), the other robbery "disap-
pears"--it is not included in the Guidelines calculation. In con-
trast, even if Defendant B is only convicted of one count of
selling drugs, the guideline sentence will be determined based
on both sales. Thus, conduct not leading to a conviction can
have a dramatic effect on the sentence of a drug defendant, but
not a robbery defendant.
It is not merely the base offense level that is affected by
these grouping and aggregation rules. For section 3D1.2(d) of-
fenses, specific offense characteristics present in counts that are
grouped despite the lack of a conviction are added to the defend-
ant's offense level. In the above example, when the defendants
are only convicted on the first count, the drug defendant, but not
the robbery defendant, receives an increase in his or her base
offense level for possessing a gun during the second offense.
Similarly, assume a defendant in a fraud case engaged in more
than minimal planning and pretended to be acting on behalf of a
charitable organization. Even if the defendant was not con-
victed for this conduct, the defendant's offense level would be
increased by four levels since it occurred in the same course of
conduct as the offense of conviction. 146
would be grouped together, and the defendanfs resulting offense level would be
27 - the level of the highest count in the group). The total number of "units"
under § 3D1.4 would be one and one-half (one for the count with the highest
level, plus one half for the other count because it is five to eight levels less
serious than the highest level). See id. § 3D1.4(b). A total of one and one-half
units adds one level to the highest group, so the final offense level from Chapter
Two would be 28.
Defendant B's offense level would be determined differently. The drug traf-
ficking guideline, § 2D1.1, is included in § 3D1.2(d), which requires the court to
treat both counts as one group and aggregate all of the conduct and harm. Id.
§§ 2D1.1, 3D1.2(d). Thus, the offense level would be 28: the base offense level
of 26, is drawn from the Drug Quantity Table and based on a total of six grams
of cocaine base from the two offenses, plus two levels for the possession of a gun.
See id. §§ 2D1.1(c)(9) & 2D1.1(bX1), respectively.
145. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5A.
146. See id. § 2Fl.l(b)(2), (b)(3).
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Some of the adjustments from Chapter Three of the Guide-
lines can compound this effect. Adjustments such as vulnerable
victim1 47 and leadership role in the offense 148 can, for offenses
grouped under section 3D1.2(d), be based on conduct in related
counts for which the defendant has not been convicted. The
same is not true for non-3D1.2(d) offenses, like robbery. This is
because most of the Chapter Three adjustments are tied into the
relevant conduct principle. The sentencing judge makes adjust-
ments such as vulnerable victim and aggravating role in the of-
fense based on all of the defendant's relevant conduct, not just
that occurring in the offense of conviction. 49
Furthermore, for defendants convicted of non-3D1.2(d) of-
fenses, even the presence of a Chapter Three adjustment factor
in a second count of conviction may not effect the guideline
range. If a defendant has been convicted of two robberies, with
offense levels (excluding adjustments from Chapter Three) of
thirty and twenty-six respectively, an increase in the second
count's level to twenty-eight for selecting a vulnerable victim
will have no effect on the applicable guideline range, despite the
conviction on that count.'50 For a 3D1.2(d) offense, in contrast,
the presence of a vulnerable victim in a related count will cause
a two level increase, whether or not the defendant is convicted of
that second count.
The impact of a second charge of equal or lesser seriousness,
in terms of the offense level associated with that second charge,
also differs greatly depending upon the nature of the offenses.
For the robbery defendant, conviction on a second robbery count
of equal seriousness will increase the offense level by two.' l l
For the offender sentenced under a 3D1.2(d)-grouped offense,
the impact is much less predictable. If it closely resembles the
first count, the second count may have no effect on the guideline
range, adding little to the base offense level, specific offense
characteristics, or adjustments applicable to the first count. 152
147. Id. § 3A1.1.
148. Id. § 3B1.1.
149. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1Bl.3(a).
150. A conviction on a second robbery count with an offense level of either 26
or 28 would add two levels to the offense level of the first count. See id. § 3D1.4.
151. See id. § 3D1.4.
152. For example, assume that a defendant has committed two frauds in the
same course of conduct. The first netted $40,000, involved more than minimal
planning, a vulnerable victim, and an abuse of a position of trust. The second
fraud netted $30,000, but was otherwise identical to the first. The offense level
applicable to each fraud considered separately would be sixteen: base offense
level of six, plus four levels for the amount of the fraud, plus two levels each for
[Vol. 78:403
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A second count with the same offense level but with a different
mix of specific offense characteristics and adjustments, however,
could increase the offense level by many levels 15 3 Thus, the sec-
ond robbery adds two levels, but only if the defendant is con-
victed of both crimes; the second fraud may add nothing even if
it results in a conviction, or it may add months or years to the
presumptive sentence even if there has not been a conviction on
that second count.
The consequences of this situation for plea bargaining are
dramatic, particularly if the defendant has committed multiple
offenses with very different offense levels. For non-3D1.2(d)
counts the prosecutor can offer the defendant potentially very
large sentence decreases if the defendant is allowed to plead to
the lesser charge, thus eliminating guideline consideration of
the more-serious-offense. The prosecutor can offer Defendant A,
who robbed two banks, a reduction of six levels (not including
two additional levels for accepting responsibility) by dropping
the second count. For a defendant with no prior record, this
reduces the likely sentence approximately three and one-half
years.' 54 In contrast, dropping the second of Defendant B's
crack sales has no effect on the guideline range. Thus, as one
would expect, as the Guidelines are designed to be applied, the
more than minimal planning, vulnerable victim, and abuse of a position of
trust. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 2Fl.(a), 2Fl.(b)(1), 2FL.(b)(2), 3A1.1 &
3B1.3 respectively. Grouping them together would have no effect on the guide-
line range because the total amount, $70,000, does not provide any increase
over the lower individual amounts, and the specific offense characteristics and
adjustments are identical.
153. In this example, again assume that a defendant has committed two
frauds in the same course of conduct. The first netted $40,000, involved more
than minimal planning, a vulnerable victim, and an abuse of a position of trust.
The second fraud netted $175,000, and the defendant played a managerial role
in the offense. As in the prior example, the offense level applicable to the first
fraud would be sixteen. See supra note 152. The offense level applicable to the
second fraud would also be sixteen (base offense level of six, plus seven levels
for the amount of the fraud, plus three levels for the managerial role). See
U.S.S.G., supra note 2, §§ 2Fl.(a), 2F1.1(b)(1), & 3B1.1(b) respectively. Unlike
the previous example, however, grouping these two offenses together would pro-
duce an increase in the offense level to twenty-three (base offense level of six,
plus eight levels for the amount of the fraud, plus three levels for the manage-
rial role, plus two levels each for more than minimal planning, vulnerable vic-
tim, and abuse of a position of trust). Id. §§ 2F1.1(a), 2Fl.(b)(1), 3B1.l(b),
2FL.(b)(2), 3AL.1 & 3B1.3 respectively. This seven level increase would more
than double the offender's likely prison sentence, from a range of 21 to 27
months to a range of 46 to 57 months. Id. § 5A (Sentencing Table).
154. This reduction assumes the judge selected the midpoint from the appli-
cable guideline range.
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utility of charge bargaining is dramatically different depending
on whether alleged related-offense sentencing applies.' 55
B. THE RATIONALE FOR ALLEGED RELATED-OFFENSE
SENTENCING
As illustrated above, the Guidelines divide federal criminal
offenses into two categories, those that fall under Section
3D1.2(d) and those that do not, and treat alleged related-of-
fenses in each category dramatically differently. This stark con-
trast in treatment raises two questions: why did the Sentencing
Commission include mandatory alleged related-offense sentenc-
ing at all, and why did it distinguish between the two categories
of cases?
In view of the serious questions of fairness raised by em-
ploying alleged related-offense sentencing and the marked dis-
crepancy in the manner in which the two categories of offenses
are treated, and the fact that this practice deviates sharply from
past practice and all previous efforts at sentencing reform, 5 6
one would reasonably expect the Sentencing Commission to offer
a thoroughgoing justification for its position. Unfortunately, the
Sentencing Commission's rationale for the alleged related-of-
fense component of the Guidelines is sketchy at best.15 7 The
only real discussion takes place in the commentary to section
lB1.3, the relevant conduct guideline.' 58 Here the Sentencing
Commission explains why alleged related-offense real-offense
sentencing applies to offenses when the guideline range is deter-
mined largely by an amount or quantity as follows:
Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) adopt different rules because offenses of
the character dealt with in subsection (a)(2) (i.e., to which § 3D1.2(d)
applies) often involve a pattern of misconduct that cannot readily be
broken into discrete, identifiable units that are meaningful for pur-
poses of sentencing.... In addition, the distinctions that the law
makes as to what constitutes separate counts or offenses often turn on
technical elements that are not especially meaningful for purposes of
sentencing .... Another consideration is that in a pattern of small
thefts, for example, it is important to take into account the full range of
155. But see infra notes 178-209 and accompanying text (discussing the
ways in which plea bargaining retains vitality despite alleged related-offense
sentencing).
156. See supra note 141.
157. This is consistent with the Sentencing Commission's general failure to
articulate its principles. See supra note 75 and infra part lV.B.
158. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3. The section of Chapter One, part
A(4)(a) labeled "Real Offense vs. Charge Offense Sentencing" does not address
the substance of alleged related-offense sentencing, and is generally limited to a
justification of the Commission's approach to offense characteristics.
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related conduct. Relying on the entire range of conduct, regardless of
the number of counts that are alleged or on which a conviction is ob-
tained, appears to be the most reasonable approach to writing worka-
ble guidelines for these offenses. Conversely, when § 3D1.2(d) does not
apply, so that convictions on multiple counts are considered separately
in determining the guideline sentencing range, the guidelines prohibit
aggregation of quantities from other counts in order to prevent "double
counting" of the conduct and harm from each count of conviction. Con-
tinuing offenses present similar practical problems. The reference to
§ 3D1.2(d), which provides for grouping of multiple counts arising out
of a continuing offense when the offense guideline takes the continuing
nature into account, also prevents double counting.1 5 9
This explanation is rather opaque. For example, the Com-
mission states that the offenses subject to alleged related-of-
fense sentencing often "involve a pattern of misconduct that
cannot readily be broken into discrete, identifiable units that are
meaningful for purposes of sentencing." The Commission seems
to be saying that just punishment requires the court to take into
account the defendant's entire range of related conduct for such
offenses. One must ask, however, why the counts of conviction
do not fairly reflect the conduct for which the defendant should
be punished. If the "pattern of misconduct" can be identified at
sentencing, the elements of that pattern should be chargeable.
If such elements are not charged, it must be that the prosecutor
chose not to bring all of the possible charges, some charges were
bargained away, or a jury rejected some charges and acquitted
the defendant.
The Sentencing Commission's rationale for alleged related-
offense sentencing, then, seems to focus primarily on the fear of
"count manipulation" in a charge-offense system and seeks to
correct "erroneous" charging and bargaining decisions. 160 This
is in effect a restatement of the conventional wisdom that a
charge-offense system shifts sentencing authority to the prose-
cutor.161 Although the Commission does not elaborate on this
concept, it would seem that count manipulation could manifest
itself in one of two ways: undercharging or overcharging. A
prosecutor might seek to ensure an unduly lenient sentence for
an offender by bringing charges that, in terms of the number of
counts or their severity, understate the seriousness of the of-
fender's misconduct. Conversely, if the number of counts affect
159. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3 (Background).
160. The Commission's concern with correcting "erroneous" acquittals
seems secondary, as acquittals are not discussed in any of the Guidelines sec-
tions or commentary applicable to alleged related-offense sentencing.
161. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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the severity of the resulting sentence, a prosecutor could punish
an offender by taking what was really one criminal episode and
breaking it up into a number of counts.
Neither of these possible explanations for the Sentencing
Commission's decision to adopt a version of alleged related-of-
fense sentencing withstands closer scrutiny. Although the abil-
ity of the prosecutor to secure overly lenient sentences for
favored offenders would certainly contribute to unwarranted
disparity, this is a particularly weak justification for the Sen-
tencing Commission's decision to punish defendants based on
crimes for which they have not been convicted. First, its goal is
probably unattainable. There are many sources of prosecutorial
leniency outside of the control of the Sentencing Commission.
The prosecutor can decline to file charges, or can fie charges
with a low statutory maximum penalty.162 Through "fact bar-
gaining"163 and other devices, the prosecutor can keep from the
court the information necessary to the operation of real-offense
sentencing. In addition, the Guidelines themselves offer prose-
cutors avenues to circumvent real-offense sentencing. These av-
enues include charging counts not subject to grouping under
section 3D1.2(d), which are therefore not eligible for alleged re-
lated-offense treatment, T6 and filing substantial assistance mo-
tions under section 5K1.1, which authorizes the court to depart
below the applicable guideline range, even if such motions are
not completely warranted. 165
Even if adopting real-offense sentencing would inhibit per-
missive plea bargains, such a policy would be unwise. There is
little reason to believe that undue prosecutorial leniency seri-
ously obstructs the imposition of just punishment or frequently
162. Individual federal prosecutors have great latitude in selecting the
charges to be pursued. See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of
Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 506-12 (1992); see
also, Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 206-07 (describing the ability of prosecutors
to select charges to avoid mandatory sentences).
163. See, e.g., Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162, at 547 ("Fact bargaining
occurs most often with respect to the amount of drugs or the particular drug
involved, such as substituting cocaine for crack, or in the dollar amount in-
volved in economic crimes.").
164. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
165. Schulhofer and Nagel have uncovered evidence that some prosecutors
seem on occasion to make unwarranted substantial assistance motions. See
Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162, at 522-23, 531-32, 550-51. Probation of-
ficers in one district the authors studied estimate that there is guideline eva-
sion in 50% of the cases when the defendant provides some cooperation. Id. at
541.
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deprecates the seriousness of an offense. It is probably fair to
assume that prosecutors on the whole are not disposed toward
undue leniency. When prosecutors offer favorable treatment to
a defendant, it is usually either a pragmatic response to
caseload pressure, the vagaries of trial, the need to obtain the
defendant's cooperation in other prosecutions, or, as has been
evident under the Guidelines, a reaction to clearly excessive
sentences. Policy makers should not lightly eliminate a safety
valve mechanism of this sort. If they think that such practices
are problematic, they should address such problems by develop-
ing explicit controls or guidelines regulating the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, 166 rather than by embracing alleged re-
lated-offense sentencing. The radical response of alleged re-
lated-offense sentencing is not commensurate with the problems
it seeks to remedy.
The other credible rationale for the Sentencing Commis-
sion's adoption of alleged related-offense sentencing, that prose-
cutors in a charge-oriented system may be able to inflate a
defendant's sentences by breaking up one criminal episode into
a number of counts, presents a more plausible and appropriate
concern. Prosecutors could bring a typical mail fraud case, for
example, as one count, alleging the entire scheme, or as many
counts, since each mailing is a separate offense. 167 It would in-
deed be disquieting if a prosecutor could increase the defend-
ant's exposure by filing many counts, rather than one count
alleging the same misconduct. 168 The prosecutor's power would
be greatly enhanced, with all of the concerns that scenario
raises. Unwarranted disparity would increase, because, depend-
ing upon the prosecutor's decisions, defendants who committed
and were convicted of identical criminal behavior could receive
substantially different sentences.
These concerns, although legitimate, do not justify alleged
related-offense sentencing. In the first place, it is not clear to
what extent the Guidelines' version of alleged related-offense
166. Indeed, commentators have made many suggestions for the creation of
prosecutorial guidelines governing charging and bargaining. See, e.g., Norman
Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
UCLA L. Ray. 1, 8, 25-34 (1971); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Sentencing Issues Fac-
ing the New Department of Justice, 5 FED. SENTENCING REP. 225 (1993); James
Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 651, 678-83 (1976).
167. See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916).
168. See United States v. Wheelwright, 918 F.2d 226, 229-30 (1st Cir. 1990)
(noting that the Guidelines' relevant conduct approach to "fungible items" is
designed to prevent double counting of amounts).
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sentencing in fact reduces the prosecutor's ability to influence
the severity of the defendant's sentence. The prosecutor can ma-
nipulate, and increase, the likely sentence for a particular de-
fendant by, for example, charging offenses with high statutory
m axmum or mandatory minimum sentences, bringing addi-
tional charges not subject to grouping under § 3D1.2(d), or
bringing sequential charges against a defendant in separate
trials.169
More important, although a concern with punitive count
manipulation may warrant aggregation of counts of conviction,
it does not justify equating an alleged related-offense with a con-
viction offense. In other words, if the Sentencing Commission
wished to enforce the principle that two defendants convicted of
the same misconduct should not receive different sentences de-
pending upon whether the prosecutor chooses to break up the
criminal episode into numerous counts, the most sensible ap-
proach would be to devise rules diminishing the importance of
the number of counts of conviction. One way to do this would be
the approach taken in the grouping rule of section 3D1.2(d). The
Guidelines could identify those types of offenses that "involve a
pattern of misconduct that cannot readily be broken into dis-
crete, identifiable units that are meaningful for purposes of sen-
tencing"170 and aggregate all of the counts of conviction for such
offenses.
Alleged related-offense sentencing is essentially irrelevant
to the question of punitive count manipulation. In the absence
of alleged related-offense sentencing, the prosecutor would have
an incentive to charge the defendant with all offenses the prose-
cutor thinks should influence the sentence. Whether the prose-
cutor has an incentive to break up a criminal episode into a
number of counts to obtain a harsher sentence, however, de-
pends on how the guidelines deal with counts of conviction, not
on whether alleged related-offenses are considered. In fact, re-
jecting alleged related-offense sentencing probably gives the
169. The Guidelines may limit the prosecutor's ability to increase the total
sentence by proceeding via sequential trials for the same defendant. See
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5G1.3. The operation of this Guideline section is, how-
ever, by no means clear. See, United States v. Lechuga, 975 F.2d 397, 401 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that when a defendant is convicted in separate trials of two
offenses that would be grouped if tried together, the court should impose a sen-
tence in the second case so that the total sentence is what the defendant would
have received if there had been only one trial, even if the court must depart
downward in the second case to reach that result).
170. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 111.3 (Background).
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prosecutor an incentive to bring less, rather than more counts if
there is a choice. Only in that way can the prosecutor ensure
that the sentence will be based on an alleged fraudulent scheme
as a whole, for example. If the prosecutor breaks the case up
into a number of charges, and the defendant is acquitted on any
of those counts, the allegations in those counts would not be con-
sidered at sentencing.
The prosecutor cannot gain any strategic advantage, in
terms of manipulating the sentence, by charging less than all of
the conduct for which the defendant might be convicted. 17 1 It is
therefore perverse to suggest that a defendant is protected from
count manipulation by allowing charges that the prosecutor did
not bring or dropped, or for which the defendant was acquitted,
to increase the defendant's sentence. 172
Ironically, aside from section 3D1.2(d) grouping, the Guide-
lines already have rules that diminish the effect of punitive
count manipulation. The multiple count provisions of Chapter
Three, part D reflect a reasoned approach to the difficult ques-
tion of multiple count convictions. 173 Under this approach,
counts of conviction in separate "groups" can increase the de-
fendant's sentence, but only incrementally, with a maximum in-
crease of only five levels, regardless of the amount and severity
of additional counts beyond the one yielding the highest offense
level. Thus, even if one repealed the alleged related-offense
component of the Guidelines, prosecutors in a drug case could
affect only a slight increase in the offense level by breaking a
criminal episode into a number of counts, an increase that might
171. The potential use of counts for which the defendant has been acquitted
demonstrates the grotesque nature of such a rationale. Assume the prosecutor
chooses to bring many counts against the defendant, rather than charging the
entire scheme as one count, and the defendant is then acquitted on one or more
of the counts. In this situation the Guidelines would still require the judge to
consider the acquitted counts if they were in the same course of conduct. It is
absurd to suggest that it is necessary to do this to protect the defendant from
the consequences of the prosecutor bringing multiple charges.
172. Some commentators have argued that real-offense sentencing of this
type gives the prosecutor an incentive not to bring some charges, such as those
that potentially are difficult to prove, since she knows that these allegations
will still be considered at sentencing. Freed, supra note 32, at 1714. It is proba-
bly more accurate to say that alleged related-offense sentencing reduces the
prosecutor's incentive to bring such charges. The prosecutor has nothing to lose
by bringing such charges, because even if the defendant is acquitted the prose-
cutor may still allege the facts at sentencing. Furthermore, the prosecutor still
has reasons to bring such charges, including maintaining leverage in plea nego-
tiations and increasing the statutory maximum penalties the defendant faces.
173. For a useful discussion of the drafting principle the Sentencing Com-
mission employed in this area, see Breyer, supra note 4, at 25-28.
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be offset by the decreased amount of drugs involved in each
count of conviction.
The Sentencing Commission has also failed adequately to
explain the location and manner in which it fixed the alleged
related-offense sentencing "line" between the two categories of
offenses. The differential treatment of the two categories alone
does not demonstrate that the dividing line is an irrational one.
Any time a policy line is drawn, with cases on either side of the
line dealt with differently, it will appear anomalous that cases,
similar to one another in some way, but on opposite sides of the
dividing line, receive dissimilar treatment. Whether this differ-
ential treatment is in fact anomalous depends upon the ration-
ale for these rules. To use the language of sentencing reform,
whether these disparities in the Guidelines' approach to alleged
related-offenses are unwarranted depends upon the basis for the
location of that line and the manner in which it was drawn.
Because fear of count manipulation appears to have been
the prime motivating force behind the adoption of alleged re-
lated-offense sentencing, perhaps the Sentencing Commission
felt that certain types of offenses were more susceptible to count
manipulation, namely those that "often involve a pattern of mis-
conduct that cannot readily be broken into discrete, identifiable
units that are meaningful for purposes of sentencing."174 In
other words, a prosecutor might be more likely to overlook an
additional small drug sale than an additional bank robbery.
This contention is questionable, because prosecutors have tradi-
tionally engaged in charge bargaining with all types of offenses.
More important, even if there is some truth to the idea that
some types of offenses are more susceptible to count manipula-
tion, the Commission's response misses the mark. Even if a de-
fendant is more likely to be convicted of a second robbery in the
same course of conduct than a second drug sale, once that second
robbery fails to lead to a conviction a judge should be just as
interested in the alleged robbery as the alleged drug sale. As
discussed above, possible distinctions between groups of offenses
may warrant different treatment of multiple counts of convic-
tion, but do not support alleged related-offense sentencing for
some offenses but not others.175
The Sentencing Commission's method of aggregating al-
leged related-offenses also is rather crude. For example, the
Guidelines treat alike three $10,000 thefts and one $30,000
174. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3 (Background).
175. See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.
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theft. This puts too much importance on the amount taken, a
fact that may be a matter of chance and beyond the control of
the offender. Most judges are likely to view the repeat offender
as more culpable and dangerous than the one-time offender who
happened to steal the same amount. The wisdom of the Com-
mission's approach is further undercut by the unpredictable ef-
fect of the alleged related-offense rules as compared to the
multiple count rules applicable to non-3D1.2(d) offenses: some-
times an alleged related-offense greatly increases the severity of
the sentence, sometimes it has little or no effect.' 7 6
The Sentencing Commission took a technique for separating
offenses and elevated it to a principle. The Commission decided
that for certain types of crimes, amounts would largely deter-
mine the sentence. Then, because they could easily count
amounts for nonconviction offenses, they did.'77 This mechani-
cal approach, apparently unguided by principle, seems destined
to accomplish very little of value.
C. WHAT HAS ALLEGED RELATED-OFFENSE SENTENCING
ACCOMPLISHED?
The goals of real-offense sentencing are to increase propor-
tionality, limit the impact of plea bargaining on sentencing, and
avoid excessive shifts of sentencing authority to the prosecutor.
For real-offense sentencing to be worth its costs-increased un-
fairness, or at least the appearance of unfairness, and a greater
administrative burden for the courts-there must be substantial
progress towards these goals. In almost all important respects,
the Sentencing Commission's adoption of alleged related-offense
sentencing has failed to further these goals.
Plea bargaining has retained much greater than anticipated
vitality under alleged related-offense sentencing.178 As initially
promulgated, the Guidelines offered some significant loopholes
that enabled the parties to bargain their way out of alleged re-
lated-offense sentencing. In the narcotics area, for example, the
176. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
177. Professor Albert Alschuler has criticized the entire Guidelines' under-
taking on this basis. See Alschuler, supra note 33, at 914-15 (stating that part
of the reason the Guidelines tend to be harm-based is that harms can be more
readily counted or quantified than can situational factors or offender
characteristics).
178. Commissioner flene Nagel and Professor Stephen Schulhofer have con-
ducted the most complete studies to date about plea bargaining under the
Guidelines. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 62; Nagel & Schulhofer, supra
note 162.
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Guidelines called for aggregating alleged related drug distribu-
tion offenses, but not "telephone counts" and simple possession.
Through charging and bargaining decisions, then, the prosecu-
tor could determine whether alleged related-offense sentencing
applied to a narcotics defendant. A plea to a telephone count or
simple possession charge eliminated the Guidelines' considera-
tion of other alleged drug activity in the same course of
conduct.179
The Sentencing Commission apparently recognized this sit-
uation and responded by trying to close the loopholes. In a se-
ries of amendments, the Sentencing Commission lengthened the
list of offenses subject to grouping under section 3D1.2(d) and,
accordingly, included in alleged related-offense sentencing, by
adding narcotics "telephone counts,"180 bribery,' 8 ' and some
firearms offenses.' 8 2 The Commission also considered adding
robbery to this list, but ultimately declined to do so.' 8 3 As a re-
sult, the Guidelines have become more and more alleged related-
offense oriented without the Commission carefully considering
the consequences of that shift.'8 4
Despite these changes, there remain ways to plea bargain
out of alleged related-offense sentencing under the Guidelines,
or at least to limit its impact. The prosecutor may be able to
bring charges with a statutory maximum penalty below the sen-
tence called for by the Guidelines. "Fact bargaining" can limit
the reach of relevant conduct.' 8 5 If, for example, the parties
agree that the offense involved a lesser amount of drugs than
might be provable at trial, they can manipulate, and lower, the
applicable guideline range. There is anecdotal evidence that
179. Prosecutors and defense lawyers have apparently used these same
mechanisms to evade the statutory mandatory minimum penalties applicable
to drug distribution and conpiracies. Stephen Schulhofer has wryly noted that
these provision seem to "have produced an epidemic of telephone use and sim-
ple possession," as '[i]n some federal districts, these counts have become the
most serious charge in up to thirty percent of all drug convictions." Schulhofer,
supra note 20, at 206-07; see also id. at 219.
180. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app. C, amend. 320.
181. See id. app. C, amend. 121.
182. See id. app. C, amend. 349.
183. The Sentencing Commission published a proposed amendment adding
robbery to § 3D1.2(d) in January 1991, but ultimately declined to adopt this
amendment. See 56 Fed. Reg. 1846 (Jan. 17, 1991) (proposed amendment 7(c));
56 Fed. Reg. 2276 (May 16, 1991) (failing to included this amendment in final
amendments).
184. The Guidelines have increased the use of other forms of real-offense
sentencing over time as well. See supra note 99.
185. See supra note 163.
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this type of fact bargaining does, in fact, take place. 8 6 Parties
have also used "date bargaining," which occurs when the de-
fendant agrees to plead guilty to a pre-guidelines offense for
criminal conduct straddling the Guidelines' November 1, 1987,
effective date.' 8 7 The Guidelines are then inapplicable.' 88 Fur-
thermore, the prosecutor can, in his or her sole discretion, decide
to move for a downward departure from the Guidelines based on
the defendant's "substantial assistance." 8 9 This again gives the
prosecutor the ability to vitiate real-offense sentencing and
orchestrate a lower sentence for the defendant.'9 0
Another way charge bargaining retains vitality relates to
the adjustments in Chapter Three of the Guidelines. Appar-
ently the Commission intended these adjustments to be made on
the basis of the relevant conduct principle.' 91 A defendant
might, for example, engage in several drug transactions in the
same course of conduct, but have an aggravating role in the of-
fense in only one such transaction. If the defendant pleads
guilty to one of the other counts, the aggravating role adjust-
ment would seem to still apply. Several courts, however, have
limited the role in the offense adjustments to the offense of con-
viction.192 Under such rulings, if the defendant pleads guilty to
a count in which the defendant did not play an aggravating role,
the defendant would not receive the aggravating role adjust-
ment, despite having played such a role in the related dismissed
counts. 193
186. See, e.g., Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 62, at 272-78 (discussing fact
bargaining).
187. Id. at 271-72 (discussing date bargaining).
188. See id. While date bargaining is undoubtedly occurring, it should
cease to be a significant factor as time goes on and there are fewer and fewer
straddle cases.
189. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K1.1.
190. See supra note 162.
191. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3(a).
192. See, e.g. United States v. Barbontin, 907 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1990)
superceded by statute as stated in United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292
(D.C. Cir. 1991)); United States v. Tetzlaff, 896 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1990)
superceded by statute as stated in United States v. Arrellano-Soto, Nos. 91-
50488, 91-50489, 91-50516, 91-50519, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14208 (9th Cir.
June 10, 1992); United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
superceded by statute as stated in United States v. Saucedo, 977 F.2d 597 (10th
Cir. 1991).
193. The Sentencing Commission amended the Introductory Commentary to
the Role in the Offense Section of Chapter 3, effective November 1, 1990, in an
apparent attempt to clarify that these adjustments are to be based on the de-
fendant's relevant conduct. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app. C, amend. 345.
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The parties do face certain obstacles in circumventing the
Guidelines' alleged related-offense provisions. The policies of
the Department of Justice in theory forbid a prosecutor from en-
gaging in some of the practices described above. 194 One Depart-
ment directive is that prosecutors not bargain away "readily
provable" charges. 195 The probation officer may stand in the
way of a charge bargain that deviates from the intent of the
guidelines. The judge may, based on a policy statement in the
Guidelines Manual, reject a charge bargain unless "the remain-
ing charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual of-
fense behavior and... the agreement will not undermine the
statutory purposes of sentencing." 96
In practice, however, the parties retain a great deal of flexi-
bility in plea bargaining. The Department of Justice only
loosely supervises line prosecutors,197 giving them significant
leeway.'98 Pre-indictment bargaining is particularly hard to
control.' 99 The probation officer may not have complete access
to the relevant facts, or the judge may ignore the probation of-
ficer's recommendation.200 In addition, judges remain very un-
likely to reject plea agreements, out of deference to the
prosecutor's role, hostility to the Guidelines, concern with exces-
sive sentences, or caseload pressures.
Paradoxically, then, the alleged related-offense component
of the Guidelines to some extent resembles the rejected charge-
194. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTOR!S HANDBOOK ON SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT
OF 1984 (1987) (hereinafter REDBOOK); Memorandum from Richard Thorn-
burgh, Attorney General, Plea Bargaining Under the Sentencing Reform Act
(March 13, 1989), reprinted in HUTCHISON & YELLEN, supra note 88, at app. 12.
For a discussion of these provisions, see Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 62, at
252-56; Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162, at 506-12.
195. REDBOOK, supra note 194, at 46-47.
196. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 6B1.2(a).
197. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162, at 544.
198. For example, prosecutors seem to apply a flexible concept of "readily
provable" charges, which enables them to dismiss counts in an effort to reach a
desired result in plea bargaining. Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162, at 549;
see also Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 62, at 254-56.
199. See COMMISSION, OPERATION REPORT, supra note 68, executive sum-
mary 77-78 (finding that pre-indictment bargaining is likely to cause a study to
underestimate impact of plea bargaining on sentencing); see also David N. Yel-
len, Two Cheers For "A Tale of Three Cities", 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 567, 569-70
(1992) (discussing the practice of pre-indictment bargaining and arguing that it
has increased under the Guidelines).
200. See Heaney, supra note 42, at 169 n.22 (finding that judges calculate
the guideline range differently from the manner recommended by the probation
officer in ten percent of cases); Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 62, at 274-78.
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offense approach.20 ' Real-offense sentencing remains partly
discretionary, as it was under the pre-Guidelines system; the
difference is that now the prosecutor, rather than the judge, ex-
ercises most of that discretion. Alleged related-offense sentenc-
ing, like mandatory minimum sentencing provisions, 20 2
strengthens the prosecutor's hand in plea bargaining: the prose-
cutor can dangle the "carrot" of charge-oriented sentencing
backed up by the "stick" of real-offense sentencing.20 3 If the de-
fendant pleads guilty and the prosecutor collaborates, the de-
fendant can avoid this aspect of real-offense sentencing and
receive a substantially lower sentence than would apply after
trial. If the defendant instead goes to trial, the real-offense pro-
visions loom large.20 4
The carrot and stick of plea bargaining are particularly
forceful because of the widely shared perception that the Guide-
lines require severe sentences. 20 5 To a risk averse defendant,
201. This observation is consistent with Michael Tonry's insight that the
Guidelines as a whole resemble mandatory minimum sentencing provisions far
more than the Sentencing Commission would like to acknowledge. See Tonry,
supra note 11, at 131-32.
202. The Sentencing Commission itself has issued a report highly critical of
the proliferation of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. See U.S. SEN-
TENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CoNGREss: MANDATORY MINI-
mum PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991) [hereinafter
MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT]. In particular, the Report observed that
mandatory minimum penalty provisions shift sentencing discretion to the pros-
ecutor, inviting disparity, and undercut the Guidelines' goal of increasing pro-
portionality. Id. at 27-34. Mandatory minimum penalty provisions invite
manipulation and evasion, according to the Sentencing Commission's data,
which indicates that offenders whose conduct warrants application of
mandatory sentences receive less than such mandatory sentences in approxi-
mately 41 percent of cases. Id at 89. In addition, mandatory minimum penalty
provisions appear to be applied in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 80
(finding that white defendants were sentenced below mandatory minimum pen-
alties 46% of the time, black defendants only 32.3% of the time).
203. Professor Alschuler has analogized this situation to the well known
"good-cop, bad-cop" routine, with the Sentencing Commission and the Guide-
lines as the "bad-cop," and the prosecutor offering potential relief to the defend-
ant as the "good-cop." Alschuler, supra note 33, at 928.
204. Not only has the Guidelines' alleged related-offense provision failed sig-
nificantly to limit the prosecutor's authority in plea bargaining, but the avail-
able evidence also suggests that charge-offense systems have not experienced
the dramatic shifts of power to the prosecutor that some had predicted. See,
e.g., Reitz, supra note 13, at 541. There may be multiple factors at work here,
including the state guidelines' generally more reasonable severity level. This
evidence lends further support, however, to the inappropriateness of alleged
related-offense sentencing.
205. See, e.g., Heaney, supra note 42, at 176-79 (setting forth data sug-
gesting a substantial increase in time served under the Guidelines). But see,
COMMISSION, 01ERATION REPORT, supra note 68, at executive summary 12 (in-
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this perceived severity may increase the value of the inducement
the prosecutor can offer for a guilty plea, or alternatively, the
penalty for going to trial. A guilty plea to a lesser charge may be
the defendant's only way to avoid a predictably long prison
term.20 6 This is particularly true in drug cases, where charge
bargaining may allow a defendant to evade a stern mandatory
minimum sentence.
The rates at which narcotics defendants go to trial supports
this hypothesis. The percentage of narcotics trafficking convic-
tions obtained after trial rather than by guilty plea is higher
than the trial conviction percentage for all offenses. 20 7 Con-
versely, virtually all of the convictions for simple possession and
use of communication facilities in connection with narcotics of-
fenses result from guilty pleas.208 Apparently, then, the govern-
ment uses the "carrot" of lower Guideline ranges and statutory
maximum penalties, and the avoidance of mandatory mini-
mums, as an incentive to plead guilty to lesser charges. Those
who do not accept or are not offered such bargains frequently opt
to "roll the dice" at trial.
There is no single pattern of plea bargaining under the
Guidelines. In fact, the available evidence suggests that plea
bargaining practices vary widely from district to district, from
judge to judge, and from prosecutor to prosecutor. 20 9 Similarly
terpreting the Sentencing Commission's interview data to indicate that a ma-jority of judges, federal prosecutors and probation officers consider Guideline
sentences to be "mostly appropriate"). It is clear that drug sentences at least
"are higher than those that were common prior to the Guidelines, and not just
by a little bit... [but] orders of magnitude higher." Schuhofer, supra note 32,
at 853.
206. In interviews conducted by the Sentencing Commission, approximately
25% of responding prosecutors indicated that they might negotiate a plea re-
flecting less than the defendant's total offense behavior if the guideline sen-
tence would otherwise be inappropriate. See COMIussION, OPERATION REPORT,
supra note 68, at 185, tbl. 54.
207. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1992 ANmuAL REPORT 59, tbl. 19 (1993).
In addition, a percentage of those pleading guilty to narcotics trafficking re-
ceive substantial assistance motions, thus effectively avoiding the Guidelines
and mandatory minimum penalties. See id. at 127, tbl. 50 (noting that over
70% of all downword departures are for substantial assistance). The percent-
age of narcotics trafficking defendants facing mandatory minimum terms or se-
vere Guideline ranges who opt to go to trial may therefore be significantly
higher than 44%.
208. Id. The percentages are 94.4 and 98.3, respectively.
209. See Heaney, supra note 42, at 192 (discussing differences among juris-
dictions in manipulative plea bargaining); Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162,
at 552-557 (same). For example, Nagel and Schulhofer estimate that in one
district plea bargaining is used to circumvent the guidelines in over 25% of the
cases, and to a "huge" extent in many of such cases. Id. at 534. In another
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situated offenders may receive very different guideline ranges
depending on such factors as the policies of the local U.S. Attor-
ney's office, the skill of defense counsel, and the attitudes of the
prosecutor, judge, and probation officer. This diversity of atti-
tudes and approaches introduces disparity and undermines the
goals of alleged related-offense sentencing.
The complexity of the relevant conduct standard also con-
tributes to unwarranted disparity. Complexity invites errors in
application or inconsistent interpretation of key concepts. Ac-
cording to one commentator, "District judges, prosecutors, de-
fenders, and probation officers are today demonstrating widely
different attitudes and practices respecting relevant conduct
within and across districts."2 10 A recent study by the Federal
Judicial Center confirms this hypothesis.21 ' Many private de-
fense counsel, in particular, have only a limited grasp of the in-
tricacies lurking in the Guidelines. 212
Proportionality, too, has been an elusive goal.2 13 In fact, the
aggregation required by the Guidelines' alleged related-offense
principle, combined with the Guidelines' excessive reliance on
harm- and quantity-based specific offense characteristics, 214 has
district they found manipulation in only 7-11% of guilty plea cases. Id. at 526.
The forms, as well as the extent, of manipulation appear to vary as well.
210. Freed, supra note 32, at 1715.
211. The study prepared for the Federal Judicial Center found that proba-
tion officers apply different interpretations to the relevant conduct rules, result-
ing in different versions of real offense sentencing and dramatically different
sentencing ranges. See Pamela B. Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An Empirical
Study of the Application of Relevant Conduct Guideline § 1B1.3, 4 FED. SEN-
TENCING REP. 330 (1992).
212. See, e.g., COMMIssIoN, OPERATION REPORT, supra note 68, at 90-93 (pri-
vate attorneys' knowledge of Guidelines rated as fair or poor by most judges,
prosecutors, and probation officers); Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162, at
530 (indicating that probation officers rated the competence of private defense
counsel in Guideline matters as "abysmal").
213. Professor Stephen Schulhofer has argued that excessive uniformity,
particularly in drug cases, rather than unwarranted disparity, is the most seri-
ous problem with the Guidelines. Schulhofer, supra note 32, at 851-61. Com-
missioner Ilene Nagel has acknowledged that the Sentencing Commission paid
more attention to uniformity than proportionality. See Nagel, supra note 29, at
934. Nagel explained that "while every effort was made to treat like offenders
alike, less attention was given in the first set of guidelines, partly because of
time constraints, to the possibility of over or under-defining like offenders." Id.
Nagel stated further that "the emphasis was more on making sentences alike,
and less on insuring the likeness of those grouped together for similar treat-
ment." Id.
214. Professor Paul Robinson, the only original member of the Sentencing
Commission who dissented from the Guidelines, warned early on about this
risk of excessive uniformity:
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reinforced disproportionate sentencing.21 5 For crimes like lar-
ceny, fraud, and especially narcotics offenses, the quantity or
value involved drives the sentence, a fact that is often beyond
the defendant's control or expectations. 216 The effect of these
amounts is magnified because alleged related-offenses, in which
the defendant may not have participated personally, are aggre-
gated and the amounts count as much for relatively minor par-
ticipants in the offense as they do for more culpable
individuals. 217 This irrationality, combined with widespread
plea bargaining manipulation and evasion, results in Guideline
ranges that may not reflect anything near the defendant's true
culpability.
The Guidelines' heavy reliance on quantities has also con-
tributed to another, unanticipated, increase in the prosecution's
ability to influence sentences. 218 One of the most unsettling de-
velopments under the Guidelines is the ability of law enforce-
ment officers to manipulate the likely sentence by selecting the
amount of narcotics to be proposed to a suspect in an undercover
Uniformity is desirable, however, only among offenses and offenders
that are similar according to the factors that are relevant to the sys-
tem's distributive principle. For example, a system that sanctions all
forms of unlawful takings solely according to the value of the property
taken may increase uniformity, but may frustrate both deterrence and
just punishment.
Robinson, supra note 45, at 9.
215. See Schulhofer, supra note 32, at 853-54 (criticizing the Guidelines' re-
liance on quantities in drug cases). At times, the Guidelines go beyond mere
irrationality into the realm of the bizarre. The Supreme Court noted in Chap-
man v. United States, that the Guideline range for a first offender convicted of
selling 100 doses of LSD can range from 10 to 16 months if the drug was in pure
form, to 27 to 33 months if it was contained in gelatin capsules, to 63 to 78
months if the LSD were on blotter paper, to 188 to 235 months if the doses were
in sugar cubes. Chapman v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1924 n.2 (1991)
reh'g denied 112 S.Ct. 17 (1991); see also Alschuler, supra note 34, at 919.
216. See supra note 176 and preceding text.
217. Another source of disproportionality is the prosecutor's sole power to
authorize the judge to depart from the Guidelines based on the defendant's sub-
stantial assistance. See supra notes 64-66. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
those higher up in a criminal enterprise, having more information that is useful
to the government, may receive a disproportional amount of such motions and
thus receive shorter sentences than their less culpable collaborators. Freed,
supra note 31, at 1704-05.
218. See Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Fail-
ure to Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before
Arrest, 1993 Wis. L. REy. 187, 205-14 (1993) (arguing that the Guidelines en-
courage and enable prosecutors and law enforcement officials to manipulate in-
vestigations and sting operations in order to increase offender's prison terms).
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operation.219 Because the amount under consideration is criti-
cal for Guideline and mandatory minimum penalty purposes,
the government can in effect determine which defendants re-
ceive longer sentences by suggesting larger amounts.2 20
The emerging picture is hardly encouraging. It is by no
means clear that alleged related-offense sentencing has accom-
plished the Sentencing Commission's goals of increasing propor-
tionality and limiting the impact of plea bargaining221 and the
power of the prosecutor.222 There is little evidence that the
Guidelines have significantly reduced unwarranted sentencing
disparity.223 Instead, the Guidelines produce unfairness, irra-
219. For a description of such practices, see Heaney, supra note 42, at 195-
97.
220. Some courts have attempted to mitigate the effects of such practices.
See, e.g., United States v. Barth 990 F.2d 422, 424-25 (8th Cir. 1993) (recogniz-
ing the concept of "sentencing entrapment" that may, in some cases, justify a
downward departure from the Guidelines).
221. According to the Sentencing Commission's own data, published as part
of a congressionally mandated evaluation of the Guidelines, there is an uncer-
tain connection between the alleged related offense sentencing rules and the
impact plea agreements have on sentences. See COMMISSION, OPERATION RE-
PORT, supra note 68, at 188, tbl. 142. For example, in the following pairs of
offense types, the percentage of guilty plea cases in which the plea agreement
had an impact on the sentence is comparable:
§ 3D1.2(d) grouped offenses non-§ 3D1.2(d) grouped offenses
drug trafficking drug possession; burglary
larceny; embezzlement immigration
tax; firearms robbery
222. See Heaney, supra note 42, at 229 (arguing that "it is clear that the
prosecutor has as much control under the present system as he would under an
offense-of-conviction model").
223. There has been a vigorous debate over whether or to what extent the
Guidelines may be reducing unwarranted disparity. The evidence is best de-
scribed as inconclusive. See Tonry, supra note 208, at 142-45 (reviewing evalu-
ations of the Guidelines). The Sentencing Commission contends that the
Guidelines have significantly reduced disparity, at least for the selected groups
of offenses the Commission studied. COMIssioN, OPERATION REPORT, supra
note 68, at executive summary 31-54. The General Accounting Office deter-
mined after reviewing the Commission's analysis and conducting its own study
that although the Commission's analysis demonstrated some reduction in dis-
parity for selected offenses, "limitations and inconsistencies in the data avail-
able for pre-Guidelines and Guidelines offenders made it impossible to
determine how effective the sentencing guidelines have been in reducing overall
sentencing disparity." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES: CENTRAL QUEsTIONS REMAIN UNANSWERED 10-11 (1992). Interestingly,
the chairman of the Sentencing Commission urged the G.A.O. to title its study
"Sentencing Guidelines: Disparity Reduced, But Some Questions Remain." Id.
at 182; see also Heaney, supra note 42, at 164 (arguing that "there is little
evidence to suggest that the congressional objective of reducing unwarranted
sentencing disparity has been achieved"); William W. Willdns, Response to
Judge Heaney, 29 Am. CEm L. REv. 795, 799-807 (1992) (criticizing Judge He-
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tionality, and hidden disparity. Rather than being an effective
compromise, the Guidelines seem to have captured some of the
worst aspects of both charge- and real-offense sentencing.
V. A REVISED APPROACH TO REAL-OFFENSE
SENTENCING
A. ALLEGED RELATED-OFFENSE SENTENCING
The Sentencing Commission's adoption of mandatory al-
leged related-offense sentencing is indefensible. The theoretical
underpinnings of this radical reform are weak and unpersua-
sive. This effort has also failed to achieve the Commission's
aims: proportionality is fragile, prosecutorial power is height-
ened, and the parties retain the ability to circumvent the guide-
lines through plea bargaining, an opportunity they are
exercising in part because of the harshness and rigidity gener-
ated by this form of real-offense sentencing. At the same time,
the principal drawback of real-offense sentencing, the appear-
ance and reality of unfairness, has been all too apparent. In ad-
dition, the evidence available from state guideline systems that
have rejected alleged related-offense sentencing does not vali-
date the fear of uncontrolled plea bargaining that apparently
motivated the Sentencing Commission.224 Any legislature or
sentencing commission constructing a new sentencing system
should reject this approach and should confront real-offense sen-
tencing in a manner more in harmony with the goals of sentenc-
ing reform.
Some have suggested reform rather than abolition.225 Cer-
tainly there is some appeal to this argument, at least if one ac-
cepts the legitimacy of basing sentences on crimes not proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. A critical examination of how a
modified alleged related-offense system might work demon-
strates, however, the shortcomings of a reform approach. A first
step might be to eliminate consideration of alleged criminal con-
aney's methodology and conclusions); cf. Alschuler, supra note 33, at 915-18
(suggesting that studies purporting to demonstrate reduced disparity under
sentencing guidelines are misleading).
224. See Reitz, supra note 13, at 541 (citing studies of Minnesota, Washing-
ton, and Florida experiences for the proposition that "plea bargaining behaviors
have not changed radically following the adoption of conviction-offense
practice").
225. See, e.g., Jon 0. Newman, Five Guideline Improvements, 5 FED. SEN-
TENciNG REP. 190 (1993).
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duct of which the defendant has been acquitted.226 Although ap-
parently constitutional under current doctrine because of the
lower standard of proof applicable at sentencing, holding one ac-
countable for a charge that the government has tried and failed
to prove is probably the most disturbing form of alleged related-
offense sentencing.227 The perceived unfairness of this approach
had, prior to the introduction of the Guidelines, led the United
States Parole Commission, which itself took a real-offense ap-
proach to release decisions, generally to refuse to consider ac-
quitted conduct.228 The Sentencing Commission recently
considered but declined to take a similar step.229
Rejecting acquitted conduct would be important symboli-
cally, and it would eliminate some of the most unseemly results
under the Guidelines. 230 The practical impact of such a step is
unclear, however, given the lack of available information about
the frequency of acquitted conduct having a measurable effect
on the Guidelines' calculations. Furthermore, the government
could undercut the potential impact of such a restriction
through its charging policies. If the prosecutor believed that ac-
quittal on a particular charge was a realistic possibility, the
prosecutor could simply decline to pursue that charge and seek
to introduce it as an alleged related-offense at sentencing. With-
226. The Ninth Circuit, alone among the federal courts of appeals, has re-
stricted the use of acquitted conduct under the guidelines. See United States v.
Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that upward departure cannot be
based on acquitted conduct).
227. See Reitz, supra note 13, at 552 (recommending "the restoration of the
legal force of acquittals at sentencing through a prohibition of the consideration
of facts embraced in charges for which the defendant has been acquitted").
228. An important limitation on the Parole Commission guidelines' real-of-
fense approach was that "the Commission shall not consider in any determina-
tion, charges upon which a prisoner was found not guilty after trial unless
reliable information is presented that was not introduced into evidence at such
trial (e.g., a subsequent admission or other clear indication of guilt)." 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.19(c) (1980). The Parole Commission, which is in the process of being
phased out, modified this limitation after the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
were introduced by substituting a statement of general policy with respect to
such charges. 56 Fed. Reg. 30,867 (1991).
229. See U.S. SENTENCING COMIUSSION, PROPOSED GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS
FOR PUBLIC CoMMENT amend. 1 (1993); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 62832 (Dec. 31,
1992).
230. For example, in United States v. Concepcion, the Second Circuit ruled
that the sentencing court correctly increased the defendant's applicable guide-
line range from 12 to 36 months to 210 to 262 months based upon conduct for
which the defendant had been acquitted. United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d
369, 387-89 (2d Cir. 1992); see also id. at 393-94 (Newman, J., concurring)
(describing as "bizarre" this result required by the Guidelines and expressing
"the hope that some revision may receive serious consideration").
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out an acquittal on the charge, the information would not be
barred. The prosecutor would sacrifice the longer statutory
maximum penalty that would apply if there were an additional
count of conviction, but given the prevailing high maximum pen-
alties, in most cases this would be only a slight impediment.231
Thus, although eliminating consideration of acquitted conduct
would, on balance, be an improvement, it could also have the
counterintuitive tendency to further erode the primacy of the
guilt determining phase of the criminal process.
A related step would be to reject inclusion of alleged related-
offenses if such related charges were dropped as part of a plea
bargain. This would remedy one of the more blatant examples of
unfairness in plea bargaining under the Guidelines, 23 2 depriv-
ing the defendant of the presumed benefit of a plea bargain
without the opportunity to withdraw the plea.233 Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit has already mandated such an approach.23 4 As
with banning acquitted conduct, however, such a reform might
have some unintended consequences and open new avenues for
prosecutorial manipulation. Prosecutors might more frequently
engage in pre-indictment plea bargaining,235 or use superseding
indictments to get around such a restriction.
To take the opposite approach, real-offense sentencing advo-
cates might argue that the Sentencing Commission should ex-
tend related-offense sentencing to curtail plea bargaining. One
of the problems with the Guidelines' approach is that it fails to
explain why some offenses are subject to alleged related-offense
sentencing while others are not.23 6 As the Sentencing Commis-
sion recognized, however, full real-offense sentencing would be
unmanageable and unworkable. Furthermore, new plea bar-
gaining techniques would meet any additional steps toward
real-offense sentencing. Plea negotiators are very creative in de-
vising ways to evade restrictions placed upon them. Stephen
231. Before the Guidelines, statutory maximum penalties were generally set
with an indeterminate sentencing system in mind. The maximum was set for
the theoretical "worst case," and even such an offender would probably have
been eligible for parole after serving one-third of the sentence. Statutory maxi-
mum penalties have not generally been adjusted to more realistic levels in light
of determinate sentencing guidelines. See Tonry, Real Offense, supra note 6, at
1593.
232. See Yellen, supra note 199, at 573-74.
233. See Tonry & Coffee, supra note 19, at 158-60 (discussing illusory plea
bargaining).
234. See United States v. Fine, 946 F.2d 650, 651-52 (9th Cir. 1991).
235. See Yellen, supra note 199.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 155-58.
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Schulhofer has predicted that if Congress closes the "loopholes"
that exclude telephone counts and simple possession from
mandatory minimum penalties, guilty pleas to misprision of fel-
ony, false statements, and filing false tax returns will prolifer-
ate.237 The same sort of reaction is likely to be produced by any
effort by the Sentencing Commission to further extend the reach
of the Guidelines' real-offense provisions.
A more intriguing reform would be for the Sentencing Com-
mission to reconsider both the weight given to alleged related-
offeknses and the categories of offenses that receive such treat-
ment. Currently if an offense is within section 3D1.2(d), alleged
related-offenses are not only included in the Guideline calcula-
tion, they count as much as if the defendant were convicted of
those unproven charges. The Sentencing Commission might
strike a different balance by providing that when sentencing
calls for inclusion of alleged related-offenses, such offenses will
count less than they would if the defendant were actually con-
victed of them.238 The Guidelines could duplicate the current
treatment of multiple counts of conviction for non-§ 3D1.2(d) of-
fenses, giving such additional counts a relatively small, but pre-
dictable effect on the sentence. 239 Alternatively, the Guidelines
might designate a range of weights to be given to alleged re-
lated-offenses, depending on factors such as the defendant's role
in the alleged related-offense. 240 It might matter, for example,
whether the defendant actually committed the related-offense,
or whether the Guildelines hold the defendant responsible for
that conduct on the basis of conspiratorial or accessorial liabil-
ity. The sentencing judge might be allowed some discretion in
determining the weight given to alleged related-offenses.
237. Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 207.
238. See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 394-95 (2d Cir. 1992)(Newman, J., concurring) (opining that the Sentencing Commission made a "de-
batable but defensible decision" to incorporate modified real-offense sentencing
with "the entirely unjustified decision to price relevant conduct at exactly the
same level of severity as convicted conduct").
239. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
240. This would be similar to the approach taken by the Guidelines in sev-
eral areas. For example, the aggravated assault guideline increases the offense
level by two, four, or six levels depending upon whether the defendant caused
"bodily injury," "serious bodily injury," or "permanent or life-threatening bodily
injury." U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2A2.2(b)(3). The court is also allowed to "in-
terpolate" and increase the offense level by three or five levels if the injury is
between the specified categories. See id. The Guidelines also provide a range of
adjustments, from two to four levels, depending upon the extent of the defend-
ant's aggravating or mitigating role. See id. §§ 3Bl.1, 3B1.2.
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Such an approach has several advantages over the current
system. The unfairness of sentencing a defendant based on con-
duct for which he has not been convicted would remain, but in a
diminished form. Proportionality might be increased compared
to a charge-offense system. Parties could use plea bargaining to
influence the sentence, but to a lesser extent than in a pure
charge-based system. Similarly, plea bargaining would not be
as illusory as in a real-offense system, because dropping a count
would limit, although not completely eliminate, the effect of that
wrongdoing on the sentence.
In assessing this suggested modification, it is useful to com-
pare the Guidelines' alleged related-offense approach with its
treatment of the defendant's criminal history. The Guidelines,
like most two dimensional guideline grids,24 ' place the current
offense on one axis and the defendant's criminal history on the
other. Depending on the "slope" of the line, the criminal history
can have a greater or lesser impact on the sentence. The Guide-
lines give the current offense considerably more weight than any
single prior conviction. The most a prior conviction can increase
the defendant's sentence is an amount equal to two offense
levels.242 It seems incongruous that an alleged offense for which
a defendant has not been convicted can have a significantly
greater impact on the sentence than a prior offense for which the
defendant was convicted.
The Sentencing Commission could further restrict the cate-
gory of offenses to which alleged related-offense sentencing ap-
plies. As discussed above,243 the Commission did not carefully
articulate a rationale for determining which offenses were in-
cluded in section 1B1.3 (a)(2). The Guidelines could generally
ban alleged related-offense sentencing but allow for exceptions
when there is a particularly strong policy justification.244
241. See Miller, supra note 10.
242. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5A (Sentencing Table). For example, an
offender with an offense level of sixteen and a criminal history score of one
would have a range of 21 to 27 months. Id. If the offender had an additional
conviction worth the maximum three points, the offender's new range would be
27 to 33 months. See id. § 4A1.1 (setting the maximum points for an additional
conviction), § 5A (Sentencing Table). That is the same range as for an offense
level of eighteen and criminal history category I. See id. § 5A (Sentencing
Table).
243. See supra text accompanying note 157.
244. Washington's guidelines take this approach. For certain categories of
offenses, such as major economic crimes and crimes involving ongoing patterns
of child sexual abuse or violence against children, courts may depart from the
Guidelines if they find that the count or counts of conviction understate the
frequency of the defendant's conduct. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390(2)
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One or more of these restrictions on alleged related-offense
sentencing, perhaps combined with such procedural reforms as
applying the rules of evidence or requiring proof of other of-
fenses by clear and convincing evidence,245 could effect a more
meaningful compromise between real- and charge-offense sen-
tencing. Identifying a coherent modified approach would be dif-
ficult, but the Sentencing Commission's current approach, both
rigid and unpredictable, seems to be among the least sensible.246
In the end, reforming alleged related-offense sentencing
may alleviate the symptoms, but the disease will remain. The
problems that alleged related-offense sentencing attempts to ad-
dress are real, but there is little reason to believe that the goals
of alleged related-offense sentencing are attainable or worth the
sacrifice of fairness and due process. Greater attention to charg-
ing and bargaining practices, rather than this form of real-of-
fense sentencing, is the proper direction.247 An offender should
only be punished for the offenses that he has admitted commit-
ting, or that the government has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Sentencing Commission's ratification of alleged re-
lated-offense sentencing has done the integrity and fairness of
the federal criminal justice system a disservice and should be
repealed.
B. CONSIDERING OTHER REAL-OFFENSE CATEGORIES
This Article has scrutinized and urged the rejection of al-
leged related-offense sentencing in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. A careful examination of the other forms of real-of-
fense sentencing utilized in the Guidelines is beyond the scope of
this Article and thus this Article will not make any concrete pro-
posal concerning their use. Nonetheless, some initial observa-
tions are appropriate. It is important to re-emphasize that
(West 1988); see Reitz, supra note 13, at 539-40 (suggesting that the true basis
for the exception may be "that certain kinds of criminal harms have evoked
special concern from the public and their officials, prompting sporadic decisions
to withhold the safeguards of conviction-offense sentencing").
245. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 32, at 849 (suggesting a requirement of
"testimony in court and proof by clear and convincing evidence, at least when
dispute centers on factors such as drug quantities that have major non-discre-
tionary impact on the applicable Guideline range"); Husseini, supra note 42, at
1407-11 (arguing for adoption of the "clear and convincing" standard for Guide-
line determinations).
246. Such high reliance on amounts and quantities also increases the par-
ties' ability to manipulate the Guidelines, directly undercutting the purpose of
alleged related-offense sentencing.
247. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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before embracing any particular real-offense element, a sentenc-
ing commission must first establish its principles and goals, and
then determine which types of sentencing information will fur-
ther those goals.2 48
Alleged more-serious-offenses,2 49 alleged criminal history,
and criminal offense characteristics 250 raise the same philosoph-
ical issues as alleged related-offense sentencing. These prac-
tices deprecate the importance of the trial stage by basing the
sentence on criminal conduct for which the defendant has not
been convicted. Furthermore, alleged related-offense sentenc-
ing's failure casts serious doubt on the belief that such forms of
real-offense sentencing serve any necessary function. A sentenc-
ing commission should be very hesitant to deviate from the prin-
ciple that a conviction is a prerequisite to punishing a defendant
for conduct the legislature has chosen to label as criminal. If
guidelines do incorporate such factors, the weight accorded them
should be severely limited, as suggested above for alleged re-
lated-offenses, 251 and a standard of proof more stringent than a
preponderance of the evidence should be applied.
A caveat is necessary here. Some special rules are probably
needed for offenses, such as mail fraud2 52 and RICO, 25 3 that
cover broad ranges of conduct.2 54 Violations of these statutes
can differ so greatly from one another as to render any single
sentencing guideline impractical. If judges simply apply the
248. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 238-242 and accompanying text.
252. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
254. Ironically, concern with offenses such as mail and wire fraud and RICO
shaped the Sentencing Commission's early debates about real-offense sentenc-
ing. See Tonry, Seven Easy Steps, supra note 6, at 357 (surmising that the
Commission apparently believed that "federal criminal law is incomparably
more complex than are state criminal laws and that many federal offenses in
their labels and elements provide no meaningful basis for measuring culpabil-
ity"). This view has several weaknesses. First, even if true, it would not justify
adopting alleged related-offense sentencing, the critical aspect of the Commis-
sion's compromise, because the aforementioned complexity has nothing to do
with the need to sentence defendants based on offenses beyond the offense of
conviction. At most it could justify an expansive version of offense characteris-
tic sentencing. Second, most federal prosecutions are not of this allegedly com-
plex variety, but involve drug crimes, common law offenses like theft, robbery
and embezzlement, and uncomplicated crimes such as immigration offenses.
Id.; see also, U.S. SENTENCING COMAISSION, 1992 ANNuAL REPORT 45, tbl. 15
(1993) (reporting that 41% of defendants sentenced had a primary offense of
drug trafficking).
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guideline most applicable to the underlying offense conduct, the
approach apparently mandated by the current Guidelines, 25 r5
they can sentence the defendant for an offense that the govern-
ment has not proved. A compromise is probably appropriate.
One option the sentencing commission might consider would be
to impose a higher standard of proof, such as clear and convinc-
ing evidence, for allegations going beyond the facts proved at
trial or admitted as part of a guilty plea. In addition, the sen-
tence for these offenses should be less than that applicable to the
underlying offenses if they had been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Noncriminal offense characteristics comprise a far more le-
gitimate category of sentencing information. A system that did
not take account of aggravating or mitigating factors beyond
broad statutory definitions would risk being too crude and dis-
proportionate. Noncriminal offense characteristics are among
the least controversial forms of real-offense sentencing, because
they do not require defendants to receive enhanced penalties
based on crimes for which they have not been convicted. Virtu-
ally all participants in and observers of the criminal justice sys-
tem acknowledge the propriety of including at least some offense
characteristics in the sentencing calculations.256 It is notable
that even critics of real-offense sentencing257 and guideline sys-
tems purporting to reject it258 accept at least some reliance on
noncriminal offense characteristics.
255. See U.S.S.G, supra note 1, § 2E1.l(a) (providing that the base offense
level for racketeering offenses is the greater of 19 or the level applicable to the
underlying conduct); id. § 2F1.1 application note 13 (providing that the fraud
guideline does not apply where the offense is more aptly covered by another
guideline).
256. Judges appear to believe strongly in considering noncriminal offense
characteristics. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 23, at 54-80. The support of
the participants in the criminal justice system can be critical to the success of
guidelines, because the more support exists, the less likely manipulation and
evasion will occur.
257. Compare Freed, supra note 32, at 1712-15 (criticizing the relevant con-
duct principle) with id. at 1705 (arguing that "each case involves unique offend-
ers and offense circumstances, and their underlying stories . . . need to be
assessed and sentenced by experienced professionals exercising human judg-
ment") (citation omitted). But see Heaney, supra note 42, at 228-30 (recom-
mending replacement of the current Guidelines with a pure charge-offense
model).
258. Washington's statute allows judges to depart from the standard guide-
line range if warranted by the circumstances of the offense. The statute con-
tains a list of "illustrative factors" that may warrant a departure. Possible
mitigating factors include victim initiation of the incident, duress, or dimin-
ished capacity. Aggravating factors include selecting vulnerable victim, sub-
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Proper use of noncriminal offense characteristics may not
only further proportionality, it may also prevent overpunish-
ment. If judges are precluded from considering aggravating of-
fense characteristics, and can only impose one sentence level on
all defendants convicted of a particular offense, there would be a
tendency for penalties to be set with more serious offenders in
mind, thus overpenalizing lower level offenders.259 One could
argue that all relevant sentencing factors should be incorpo-
rated into criminal statutes and treated as elements of the of-
fense.260 This approach is philosophically pure, but somewhat
unrealistic. Criminal codes would become unwieldy, and the
trial process would bog down under the weight of additional fact
finding. Furthermore, legislatures are not capable of defining in
advance all of the relevant sentencing factors and the combina-
tions in which they may occur. As Franklin Zimring has writ-
ten, "we may simply lack the ability to comprehensively define
in advance those elements of an offense that should be consid-
ered in fixing a criminal sentence."261 A sentencing commission
also cannot anticipate all such issues, which is why sentencing
guidelines require a reasonable departure mechanism.
A potential problem with allowing consideration of noncrim-
inal offense characteristics but not criminal offense characteris-
tics, is that it may give legislatures an incentive to reduce the
specificity in criminal statutes even further. Legislatures may
realize that if they include a factor in the definition of a crime,
the judge may not rely on it at sentencing unless proved at trial
or admitted as part of a guilty plea. By omitting the factor from
the definition of the offense, a judge will be able to take it into
account at sentencing. Although some legislatures might re-
spond in this manner, allowing consideration of noncriminal of-
fense characteristics but not criminal offense characteristics
stantial monetary loss, or abuse of a position of trust. WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 9.94A.390(1)-(2) (West 1988).
259. For example, if the amount of money taken in a fraud cannot influence
the Guideline range, the Sentencing Commission will have three choices. The
range for fraud could be based on a small loss, a middle level, or a large loss. It
seems reasonable to assume that the Commission would opt for something in
the middle, with pressure to increase the level.
260. Professor Susan Herman has argued that the Guidelines system vio-
lates the Due Process Clause by relying so heavily on facts determined at sen-
tencing, instead of incorporating such sentencing factors within the statutory
definition of offenses. Herman, supra note 42.
261. Franklin E. Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: A Con-
sumer's Guide to Sentencing Reform, in SENTENCING 331 (Hyman Gross & An-
drew von Hirsch, eds. 1981).
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seems to be a lesser evil than either banning noncriminal of-
fense characteristics, which would establish a pure charge-of-
fense system, or allowing consideration of criminal offense
characteristics.
Unfettered consideration of noncriminal offense characteris-
tics, however, may not be advisable. A number of important
questions concerning the reliance on these factors remain, in-
cluding the appropriate extent their impact on sentencing, the
procedures that should be employed to determine essential sen-
tencing facts, the relevance of the defendant's state of mind,262
and the standard of review of such decisions.263 For example, a
check on the potential abuse of noncriminal offense characteris-
tics would be to limit the weight given to such factors. Under
the current Guidelines the "tail" of sentencing factors often wags
the "dog" of the underlying offense. 2 " This not only presents
serious due process concerns, it also heightens the ability of the
parties to manipulate and circumvent the Guidelines through
plea bargaining. The Commission should experiment with lim-
its on the value of such offense characteristic factors. Perhaps
the Commission should limit each factor, or all such factors in
the aggregate, to a set percentage increase in the base offense
level.
Offender characteristics do not raise the specter of punish-
ing a defendant for a crime without a conviction. Nevertheless,
there may be other reasons to limit reliance on such informa-
tion, such as the possibility of discriminatory application. The
defendant's history of criminal conviction, based on prior guilty
pleas or convictions, is also a legitimate factor to consider,
although as with noncriminal offense characteristics, the weight
given to this factor should be carefully considered.
An issue requiring further reflection is the distinction in the
federal context between criminal and noncriminal offense char-
acteristics. Because federal criminal jurisdiction is, at least in
theory, limited in nature, some acts that certainly constitute
262. For example, whether a defendant who set out to obtain $1,000,000 by
fraud should be treated the same as or differently from one who simply set out
to defraud someone and was pleasantly surprised that the crime netted
$1,000,000.
263. Possible standards range from an unreviewable decision by the judge
at which the rules of evidence do not apply (essentially the method in the pre-
Guidelines system) to a full evidentiary hearing requiring proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
264. For a devastating critique of the Sentencing Commission's reliance on
amounts in determining the sentence for drug cases, see Alschuler, supra note
33, at 918-24.
1993] 463
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
state crimes are not federal crimes. A homicide committed in
the course of a kidnapping or mail fraud, for example, probably
does not constitute a federal offense. 265 It is arguable that such
a death is simply a noncriminal offense characteristic which the
judge may properly consider in determining the sentence for kid-
napping or mail fraud. If so, it would be ironic that the court
could take into account a killing, but not less serious misconduct
that was covered by a federal criminal statute. Alternatively,
because it is almost certainly a state crime, it is arguable that a
killing is really a criminal offense characteristic, in which case
limits should be placed on its use in a federal sentencing. Be-
cause the federal government has no ability to bring charges
based on the aggravating conduct in such cases, it might not be
appropriate to preclude any consideration of a killing at sentenc-
ing. Perhaps the Guidelines should require the government to
prove such offense characteristics beyond a reasonable doubt at
sentencing before a judge can rely on them.
The propriety of considering post-offense behavior, such as
the acceptance of responsibility or obstruction or justice, derives
from the nature of such behavior. The obstruction enhancement
in the Guidelines 266 generally involves increasing the defend-
ant's punishment based on a criminal act, such as committing
perjury at trial. This practice, like alleged related-offenses, al-
leged more-serious-offenses, and criminal offense characteris-
tics, is inconsistent with the requirement of proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor is always free to pursue ad-
ditional charges against a defendant who has committed per-
jury, or has obstructed justice in some other way.
The acceptance of responsibility reduction,267 in contrast,
stands on firmer ground. It does not concern conduct for which
the defendant could be criminally charged; instead it identifies a
factor bearing on the defendant's culpability. In this sense it is
like offender characteristics. There is even less to object to here,
though, because unlike offender characteristics, acceptance of
responsibility is a one way street in the defendant's favor. Fi-
nally, the acceptance reduction is not only consistent with long-
265. For examples of federal homicide statutes, see 18 U.S.C. § 34 (1988)
(homicide in connection with destruction of aircraft or motor vehicles); 18
U.S.C. § 351(a) (1988) (killing of a member of Congress, cabinet official, or
Supreme Court Justice); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a) (1988) (killing of a witness, victim,
or informant).
266. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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standing practice, 268 it also furthers an important systemic
function of offering an inducement for guilty pleas.
26 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Six years of experience with the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines should lay to rest the notion that the most ambitious goals
of real-offense sentencing are attainable, or desirable. The Sen-
tencing Commission's incorporation of alleged related-offense
real-offense sentencing in the Guidelines has led to complexity,
inconsistent application, and a loss of confidence in the system,
while at the same time failing to ensure proportionality and to
check prosecutorial power to influence sentences. The major
sources of the Guidelines' failure-their rigidity, complexity and
severity-are all linked closely to the Sentencing Commission's
version of real-offense sentencing. This "cornerstone" of the
Guidelines is badly in need of repair.
On a broader level, the failed federal experiment with
mandatory real-offense sentencing may have some important
implications for the future of sentencing reform. A consensus
has emerged that the Guidelines have failed because they have
tried to do too much, often contrary to the sound experience-
based judgments of judges, lawyers, and probation officers. A
more sensible system would proceed more modestly, narrowing
and guiding judicial discretion, not shifting it to administrative
agencies, prosecutors and probation officers.
The search for a just and effective sentencing system is an
arduous one. The Sentencing Commission's version of real-of-
fense sentencing, however, is not part of the solution.
268. See COMMISSION, SuPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 66, at 64-66 (in-
dicating that a reduction in sentence due to the Guidelines' acceptance of re-
sponsibility is similar to reductions already obtained in plea bargaining).
269. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 3E1.1.
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